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**The Draft Program
of the Communist
International**

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AMS PRESS
NEW YORK

L. D. T R O T S K Y

The Draft Program of the Communist International

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A Criticism of Fundamentals

Introduction by James P. Cannon

NEW YORK

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C O N T E N T S

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Introduction by James P. Cannon</i>	V
A Program of International Revolution or a Program of Socialism in One Country	3
1. General Structure of the Program	4
2. The United States of Europe	7
2a. The Slogan of a Soviet United States of Europe	12
3. The Criterion of Internationalism	20
4. The Theoretical Tradition of the Party	28
5. Where is the "Social Democratic Deviation"	45
6. The Dependence of the U.S.S.R. on World Economy	48
7. The Antagonism between the Productive Forces and the National Boundaries as the Cause of the Reactionary Utopian Theory of Socialism in One Country	56
8. Fundamental Difference between National Reformism and Revolutionary Internationalism	64
9. The Theory of Socialism in One Country as a Source of Inevitable Social Patriotic Blunders	68
The Results and Prospects of the Chinese Revolution—Its Lessons for the Eastern Countries and for the Whole of the Comintern	76

1. On the Nature of the Colonial Bourgeoisie	77
2. Stages of the Chinese Revolution	88
3. Democratic Dictatorship or a Dictatorship of the Proletariat	95
4. Adventurism as a Product of Opportunism	105
5. Soviets and Revolution	110
6. The Question of the Character of the Chinese Revolution	117
7. On the Reactionary Idea of Workers' and Peasants' Parties for the East	123
8. The Benefits Obtained from the Farmers' and Peasants' International Must be Probed	135

INTRODUCTION

The Communist International, which was organized in 1919, first adopted its program at the Sixth World Congress held in July-August 1928, after having previously considered drafts at the Fourth Congress in 1922 and at the Fifth Congress in 1925. The document published here is a commentary by L. D. Trotsky on the draft program drawn up by Bucharin and Stalin before the Sixth Congress and which was subsequently adopted without any important changes. The criticism of Trotsky, written before the Sixth Congress and directed at the Bucharin-Stalin project, thus applies now to the formally adopted program of the Comintern on all essential questions, and his challenge to many of its formulations and conclusions acquires thereby all the greater seriousness.

The question of the program of the Communist International, and the criticism brought against it by one of the foremost leaders of the Russian Revolution and the International Communist movement, confronts the Communist proletariat now as a theoretical and political question of the greatest magnitude with which all practical issues of strategy and tactics are connected.

Communist theories are not abstractions but the guiding line for action. False tactics in the struggle proceed from false programmatic formulations. This axiom of Marxism has been given a fresh and tragic proof, as Trotsky points out, in the enormous blunders committed in recent years since the death of Lenin. Programmatic questions are questions of life and death for the International proletarian revolution.

Trotsky's Criticism of the Draft Program comes

to grips with the principal theoretical error which sums up and motivates the opportunist tactics pursued in recent years in the internal questions of the Soviet Union as well as in the International movement: the revisionist theory of socialism in one country. Basing himself on the fundamental teachings of Marx and Lenin, Trotsky turns all his guns on this new revisionism which has been smuggled into the Communist International since Lenin died to its great detriment. He attacks it from all sides, tearing away the covering of falsely applied quotations from Lenin and reveals its non-Leninist essence, battering down the whole, structure of falsification and scholasticism upon which it is built.

Trotsky not only annihilates the new revisionism with the hammer blows of Marxism and Leninism. He also exposes down to their roots the tactical errors connected with it and points the way for their avoidance in the future. His criticism is a searchlight in the fog of official propaganda, scholasticism and administrative decree which has been substituted for the ideological leadership of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in earlier years. Trotsky restores the best traditions and standards of Marxist and Leninist thought. He applies them to the burning questions of the day and shows the path to which we must return.

With a sure command of the theoretical weapons forged by Marx and Lenin and with an international sweep and perspective equalled by none since Lenin, Trotsky grapples with the key problems of world magnitude. The diverse and knotty questions are tied together and shown as parts of a single whole with the inter-relation of the parts explained—and always from the standpoint of revolutionary perspectives and the revolutionary solution of the world contradictions.

The criticism deals with the role of American Imperialism and with the prospect of new revolutionary situations arising from its hegemony and growing aggression. The section on the Chinese revolution and its lessons, which occupies a large part of the pamphlet, elucidates the problems of the Chinese revolution and enables the American reader, for the first time, to glimpse the actualities of this world historical event. The theses, articles and speeches of Trotsky and the other leaders of the Russian Opposition on the problems and tasks of the Chinese Revolution, which estimated the whole course of events with the most remarkable precision, were suppressed and concealed from the Parties of the entire International. This unbelievable and absolutely unprecedented procedure becomes all the more monstrous in the light of the subsequent developments which wholly confirmed the correctness of the position of Trotsky and his colleagues and revealed the Menshevist tactics of Stalin and Bucharin as the source of the cruel defeats of the Chinese proletariat. Trotsky's Criticism of the Program draws the lessons of the period of the Chinese revolution which culminated with the Canton uprising, lays bare the errors of the leadership with all their tragic consequences, and the incalculable menace for the future contained in the attempt to conceal or justify these errors in the adopted program.

In the Chinese revolution in 1926-27 the Opposition led by Trotsky proposed the slogan of Soviets uniting the workers and the peasants, under the leadership of the former **against the bourgeoisie**. They wanted to warn the workers and peasants not to trust the leaders of the Kuo Min Tang of the Left Kuo Min Tang. They wanted the workers and the vanguard of the peasants to arm themselves. They wanted complete independence for the Communist Party and in general a

course toward the establishment of a democratic dictatorship through the workers' and peasants' Soviets.

The Stalin-Bucharin leadership rejected all these proposals of the Leninist Opposition in favor of the Menshevik policy of union with the liberal bourgeoisie which in actual practise gave the hegemony to the bourgeoisie, prevented the real development of the independent Communist Party and led to the defeat of the working class. The bourgeois "allies" of the proletariat became the hangmen of the revolution just as the Opposition foretold.

All these questions of the Chinese revolution will arise again in China, India and other Eastern countries. Consequently the formulation of the questions in the program, from which the tactics of tomorrow are inseparable, becomes a matter of overshadowing importance for the whole of the Communist International.

Trotsky shows how the Bolshevik and Menshevik parties and the left wing of the German social democracy took shape on the estimation of the Russian Revolution of 1905 and says the evaluations of the results and prospects of the Chinese revolution will have no less significance for the future. We believe this to be absolutely incontestable and that the Communist battalions of the future in America as in other countries will be formed to a very large extent in this indispensable discussion. Trotsky's estimate of the Chinese revolution and its prospects, contained in his Criticism of the Program, is the greatest contribution yet made to this discussion and for that alone his document has a priceless value. In connection with this criticism, however, written after the events, it is necessary to study the other material of Trotsky and other Oppositionists **written before** the events. This material is now being translated and will

soon be published as a companion volume to the *Criticism of the Program*. The conscientious study of these historic documents of the true defenders of Leninism, in comparison with the official material, shot through as it is with revisionist errors, falsifications and contradictions, will go a long way toward the enlightenment of the American Communists on the outstanding problems of the International Communist movement.

The formation of "Farmer-Labor" Parties—that source of such exaggerated hopes and unbounded mistakes in the American Party—is reviewed at length in this volume. The underlying falsity of the whole idea of a "two-class" party is analyzed from the theoretical standpoint of Marxism and the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, and is condemned in principle—for the West as well as for the East. Trotsky's comment on the "Third Party Alliance" with LaFollette, the fight against which was led by him will be especially interesting to American Communists. All of which is a timely reminder of the heavy debt our Party owes to Trotsky. His part in saving it from the disgrace and the direct threat to its existence contained in the proposal to support LaFollette is not the only exceptional service he has rendered to it. It was his initiative which brought the assistance of the Communist International in 1922 to the task of liberating the Communist Party of America from the straight-jacket of illegality in which it had bound itself. And now it is he, above all others, who is showing the Party, and the whole Comintern, the way back to Leninism on the great world problems of the present period.

The publication of this masterpiece of Bolshevik literature, written by the foremost living leader of World Communism at the height of his powers, is a revolutionary event of great importance for the American movement. The profound influence it

has already exerted on circles of our Party who have read it in manuscript is an indication of the stimulus to revolutionary thought its publication will create in broader ranks. It is a document of conflict written in the fires of the struggle to preserve the fundamental teachings of Marx and Lenin and maintain the proletarian dictatorship of the Soviet Union.

The history of this work, which is destined to become a classic of Marxist-Leninist literature, shows up the present internal situation in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in the Communist International. Suppression, official say-so and administrative command have been substituted for the free revolutionary thought and discussion of Lenin's time to such an extent that the present leadership attempted to dispose of this contribution of the co-worker of Lenin by the simple expedient of suppressing it.

Trotsky's Criticism of the Draft Program was sent to the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, **but was never distributed to the delegates and was not discussed at the Congress.** The sole attention accorded it was its distribution to members of the Program Commission and a report on the document to the **Senioren-Konvent**, a selected group of Congress delegates, which immediately "settled" the issue without discussion. A rigid control on the document was established forthwith and the few copies which had been distributed were recalled by the Secretariat. Its "illegal" publication now in America and its simultaneous publication in the various European countries are only another proof of the futility of bureaucratic machinations when they collide with a Leninist political line. These machinations and the false line they represent had a temporary success. They brought confusion and disruption into the ranks of the workers' vanguard, and they have

not yet finished their course. This regime still maintains a formal control but its foundation is cracking. Its days are numbered. Trotsky's truth is breaking through. The logic of events and the heroic, uncompromising struggle of the Opposition are hastening the day of the victory of Leninism and its exponents in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and throughout the Comintern.

"The Draft Program of the Communist International: A Criticism of Fundamentals" by L. D. Trotsky is a great contribution to that struggle and victory.

JAMES P. CANNON.

New York, January 3, 1929.

THE DRAFT PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

A CRITICISM OF FUNDAMENTALS



THE draft program, that is, the most vital document which is to determine the work of the Comintern for many years to come, has been published only a few weeks prior to the convocation to the Congress, which is being held four years after the Fifth Congress. No reference can be made to the fact that the first draft was published prior to the Fifth Congress, precisely for the reason that it was done several years ago. The second draft differs from the first in structure and endeavors to sum up the developments of recent years. To pass this draft at the Sixth Congress, a draft which bears obvious traces of hurried, and even careless work, without a preliminary serious and scientific criticism in the press, or an extensive discussion in all Parties affiliated with the Comintern would be a very careless and precipitate act.

In the few days we had at our disposal between the receipt of the draft and the dispatch of this letter, we could deal only with some of the most vital problems which must be elucidated in the program.

A series of most important ideas of the draft which perhaps are less burning today but may become of extraordinary importance tomorrow, we are compelled, owing to the lack of time, to leave entirely without consideration. Suffice it to say we could not even receive the first draft program and we had to rely on our memory in dealing with it, as in two or three other cases. It stands to reason that all quotations have been taken from the originals after careful examination.

*A Program of International Revolution
or a Program of Socialism
in One Country.*

The chief question on the agenda of the Sixth Congress is the adoption of the program. The nature of the program can for a long time determine and make up the physiognomy of the International. The significance of a program is not so much in the way it formulates the chief theoretical ideas, which in the final analysis is merely a question of "codification," namely a question of laying down in a concise form the concrete truths and generalizations which have been definitely and firmly obtained; it is much more a question of summarizing the world economic and political experiences of the recent period, and particularly the revolutionary struggles of the last five years which were so rich in events and mistakes. The fate of the Communist International in the course of the coming years depends in the literal sense of the term on how these events, mistakes and differences are understood and evaluated in the program.

1.—GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE PROGRAM

In our epoch which is an imperialist epoch, i. e., an epoch of WORLD economics and WORLD politics, under the hegemony of finance capitalism, not a single national Communist Party can build its program wholly or chiefly on the conditions and tendencies of national development. This fully holds good also for the Party that holds sway in the U. S. S. R. The death knell for national programs was definitely sounded on August 4, 1914. The revolutionary Party of the proletariat can rely only on an international program corresponding to the nature of the present epoch as an epoch of the apex and destruction of capitalism. An international Communist program is by no means a summary of national programs or of their common features. An international program is based directly on an analysis of the conditions and tendencies of the world economic and world political system as a whole with all its points of contact and antagonism, i. e., with all the antagonistic interdependence of its parts. In the present epoch the national orientation of the proletariat must and can, to a larger extent than in the past, be based only on a world orientation, and not vice versa. Therein lies the basic and fundamental difference between the Communist International and all shades of national socialism.

Based on this, we wrote in January of this year the following:

“It is necessary to start to draw up a Program of the Comintern (Bucharin’s program is a bad program of a national section of the Comintern; it is not a program of a world Communist Party).”—(Pravda, January 25, 1928).

We have constantly insisted on this on the same grounds since 1923-1924 when the problem of the United States of America arose in its full scope as a problem of WORLD and, in the most direct sense of the word, EUROPEAN POLICY.

In boosting the new draft program **Pravda** said that a Communist program:

"differs fundamentally from the program of international Social Democracy not only by the substance of its main ideas, but by the characteristic internationalism of its construction."—(**Pravda**, May 29, 1928).

In this rather indefinite formulation is expressed the idea which we have outlined above and which was formerly stubbornly rejected. One can only welcome the departure from the first draft program presented by Bucharin which, properly speaking, did not rouse any serious exchange of opinion as it did not give enough cause for such. While the first draft gave a vague schematic reflection of the development of one abstract country toward Socialism, the new draft is trying, insistently and without success as we will unfortunately see, to take world economy as a whole as its starting point in determining the fate of its individual parts.

Linking up countries and continents of various stages of development in a system of mutual dependence and antagonism, levelling out the state of their development and at the same time enlarging the differences between them and irreconcilably setting up one country against the other, world economy has become a mighty reality which holds sway over the economy of individual countries and continents. It is this basic fact that makes the very idea of a world Communist Party a reality. Bringing world economy as a whole to the highest possible phase of development on the

basis of private property, imperialism, as the draft absolutely correctly states in its introduction:

“intensifies the contradiction between the growth of the productive forces of world economy and national State barriers.”

Without fully understanding the meaning of this, which has for the first time been vividly revealed to humanity in the last imperialist war, not a step can be made in dealing with the big questions of world politics and world revolutionary struggles.

One would only have to welcome the bold replacement of the axis of the program in the new draft were it not for the fact that in the effort to conciliate this, the only correct position, with tendencies of an entirely opposing character, the draft has become an arena containing great contradictions which undermine the fundamental significance of the new statement of principles.

2. THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

To characterize the first, fortunately discarded draft, it will suffice to say that, so far as we remember, it did not even mention the United States of America. The cardinal problems of the imperialist epoch which, by dint of the very nature of the epoch, must be taken not only in their abstract theoretical but also in their material and historical aspect, were dissolved in the first draft into a lifeless outline of a capitalist country "in general." However, the new draft, and this of course is a great step forward, states that "the economic center of the world has shifted to the United States of America"; that "the 'Dollar Republic' has become the exploiter of all countries"; that the United States "has already won world hegemony for itself," and finally that the competition (in the draft it is wrongly stated "conflict") between United States and European capitalism, primarily British capitalism, "is becoming the pivot in the world conflicts." This has already become absolutely obvious, and a program which would not contain a clear and exact definition of these main facts and features of the world situation would not be a program of an international revolutionary Party.

Unfortunately the main facts and tendencies of the international development of the new epoch indicated above are mentioned in the text of the draft, grafted on to it, so to say, in the way of theoretical back-writing without having any inter-contact with the rest of the structure and without leading to any perspective or strategical deductions.

The NEW role of America in Europe since the capitulation of the Communist Party of Germany

and the defeat of the German proletariat in 1923, has been entirely left out of consideration. It has not been made clear that the period of "stabilization," "normalization," and "pacification" of Europe including the "regeneration" of Social Democracy, has developed in close material and ideological connection with the first steps of American intervention in European affairs.

Furthermore, it has not been made clear that the inevitable further development of American expansion, the contraction of the markets of European capitalism, including the European market itself, entails the greatest military, economic and revolutionary disturbances such as will leave all disturbances of the past in the shade.

It has not been made clear that the inevitable further onslaught of the United States will place capitalist Europe on a constantly more limited ration in world economy which, of course, does not involve a mitigation, but on the contrary, a monstrous sharpening of the inter-State relations in Europe with furious paroxysms of military conflicts, because States as well as classes, are even more frantically fighting for a hunger ration, nay, a diminishing ration, than for a lavish and growing ration.

In the draft it has not been made clear that the internal chaos of the State antagonisms of Europe render hopeless a more or less serious and successful resistance to the constantly more centralized North American Republic and that the overcoming of the European chaos in the form of the Soviet United States of Europe is one of the first tasks of the proletarian revolution, which in not the least degree as a result precisely of State barriers, is much closer in Europe than in America and which will therefore most likely have to be

defended from the North American bourgeoisie.

On the other hand it has been left entirely unmentioned—and this is not the least important phase of the same world problem—that it is precisely the international strength of the United States and its unbridled expansion resulting from it, that compels it to include powder magazines throughout the world among the foundations of its structure—the antagonisms between the east and west, the class struggle in Old Europe, uprisings of the colonial masses, wars and revolution. This on the one hand transforms United States capitalism into the basic counter-revolutionary force in the present epoch, becoming constantly more interested in the maintenance of order in every corner of the globe, and on the other hand prepares the ground for a gigantic revolutionary explosion of this already dominant and still increasing world imperialist power. The logic of world relations leads to the idea that the time of this explosion cannot be very far apart from that of the proletarian revolution in Europe.

Our elucidation of the dialectics of the inter-relations between America and Europe resulted, during the last few years, in the most diversified accusations against us—accusations about our pacifist denial of the existence of European contradictions, our acceptance of Kautsky's theory of ultra-imperialism and of many other sins. There is no need to deal here with these "accusations," which at best result from a complete ignorance of the real processes and of our relations to them. But we cannot refrain from mentioning, however, that it would be difficult to waste more effort in confusing and muddling up the most vital world problem than was wasted, by the way also by the authors of the draft program, in the petty struggle

against our formulation of the problem which has been entirely confirmed by the course of events.

Efforts have been made—on paper—in the leading Communist press, also of recent date, to minimize the significance of American hegemony by referring to the imminent economic and industrial crisis in the United States. We cannot enter into a consideration of the problem of the time of the American crisis and as to its possible depth. This is not a question of program but of conjuncture. For us, of course, the inevitability of a crisis is absolutely unquestionable and, considering the present world expansion of American capitalism, its great depth and sharpness is not excluded. But the efforts to minimize or weaken the importance of North American hegemony on this ground is not justified by anything, and can only lead to most profound errors of a strategical character. On the contrary, **IN A CRITICAL EPOCH THE HEGEMONY OF THE UNITED STATES WILL PROVE EVEN MORE COMPLETE, MORE OPEN, MORE RUTHLESS, THAN IN THE PERIOD OF BOOM.** The United States will try to overcome and get out of its difficulties and helplessness primarily at the expense of Europe—regardless whether this will happen in Asia, Canada, South America, Australia or Europe itself.

It must be clearly understood that if the first period of American intervention had a stabilizing and pacifist effect on Europe, which to a considerable extent is still alive today and may occasionally recur and even become stronger (particularly in time of new defeats of the proletariat), the general line of American policy, particularly in time of economic difficulties and crises, brings the greatest

disturbances for Europe as well as for the whole world.

From here we draw the not unimportant conclusion that there will be no lack of revolutionary situations within the next ten years any more than in the past. That is why it is so important to understand the mainsprings of development so that we may not be caught by their action unawares. If in the past decade, the main cause of revolutionary situations lay in direct consequence of the imperialist war, in the second post-war decade the main causes of revolutionary situations will be in the relations between Europe and America. A big crisis in the United States will give rise to new wars and revolutions. We repeat: There will be no lack of revolutionary situations. It is all a question of an international proletarian Party, the ripeness and fighting ability of the Comintern, the correctness of its strategical positions and tactical methods.

This trend of thought has found absolutely no expression in the draft program of the Comintern. The mentioning of a fact of such great importance as the fact that "the economic center of the world has shifted to the United States of America," appears as a mere superficial newspaper remark and no more. It is of course absolutely impossible to say in justification of this that there was lack of space, for what are the questions that must find place in a program if not the principal questions? Besides, it should be added that too much space is given in the program to questions of secondary and third-rate importance—let alone the general literary looseness and the numerous repetitions, by a reduction of which the program might be condensed at least one-third.

2a.—THE SLOGAN OF A SOVIET UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

The elimination of the slogan of a Soviet United States of Europe from the new draft program, a slogan which has already been accepted by the Comintern after a drawn-out internal struggle in 1923, can by no means be justified. Or is it perhaps precisely on this question that the authors want to "return" to Lenin's position of 1915?

In regard to the slogan of the United States of Europe, Lenin, as is known, vacillated at the beginning of the war. The slogan was at first included in the theses of the **Social Democrat** (the central organ of the Party at the time) and then rejected by Lenin.

This in itself shows that its suitability was not a question of a general principle; it was merely a question of tactics, a question of comparing its plus and minus signs from the viewpoint of the given situation. Needless to say that Lenin denied the possibility of a realization of a CAPITALIST United States of Europe. That is also how I regarded the question when I advanced the United States slogan, exclusively as a perspective State form of the proletarian dictatorship in Europe.

"A more or less complete economic amalgamation of Europe ACCOMPLISHED FROM THE TOP by means of an agreement of the capitalist governments is a Utopia"—I wrote. "Here it cannot go further than partial compromises and half measures. By this alone an economic, amalgamation of Europe such as would promise colossal advantages both to the producer and consumer and to the development of culture in general, is becoming a REVOLUTIONARY TASK OF THE EUROPEAN PROLETARIAT in its struggle against imperialist protectionism and its instrument—militarism". — (Trotsky, The

Program of Peace: collected works, Vol. 3, part I, page 85. Russian edition).

Further:

"A United States of Europe represents first of all a form—the only conceivable form—of proletarian dictatorship in Europe."—(Ibid., page 92).

But even in this formulation of the question Lenin saw AT THAT TIME a certain danger. With the absence of experience of a proletarian dictatorship in one country, the absence of a theoretical clarity on this question, even in the left wing of the social democracy of that period, the slogan of a United States of Europe might have given rise to the idea that the proletarian revolution must begin simultaneously at least on the whole European continent. It is against this danger that Lenin issued a warning on this question. There was not a shade of difference between Lenin and myself. I wrote at the time:

"that not a single country must 'wait' for the other countries in its struggle. This elementary idea it will be useful and necessary to repeat so that the policy of international inaction may not be substituted for the conception of parallel international action. Without waiting for the others, we begin and continue the struggle on national grounds with the full conviction that our initiative will give an impulse to the struggle in other countries."—(Ibid., page 89-90).

Then follow my words which Stalin presented at the Seventh Plenum of the E. C. C. I. as the most vicious expression of "Trotskyism," i. e., as a "disbelief" in the inner forces of the revolution and the hope for aid from without.

"And if this" (development of the revolution in other countries—L.T.) "will not occur, it is hopeless to think (this is borne out by history and by theoretical thought) that for instance revolutionary Russia would be able to hold out in face of conserv-

ative Europe, or that Socialist Germany would be able to remain isolated in a capitalist world."—(Ibid., page 89-90).

On the ground of this and two of three similar quotations is based the condemnation of "Trotskyism" by the Seventh Plenum as having held in this "fundamental question" a position "which has nothing in common with Leninism." We will therefore stop for a moment and listen to Lenin himself.

On March 7, 1918 he said on the question of the Brest-Litovsk Peace the following:

"This is a lesson because the absolute truth is that without a revolution in Germany we will perish."— (Vol. 15, page 132, Russian Edition).

A week later he said:

"World imperialism side by side with a victorious onslaught of the social revolution cannot get along together."—(Ibid., page 175).

A few days later on April 23, Lenin said:

"Our BACKWARDNESS has thrust us forward and WE WILL PERISH if we will not be able to hold out until we meet with the mighty support of the INSURRECTIONARY workers of other countries."—(Ibid., page 187. Our emphasis).

But perhaps this was all said under the special influence of the Brest Litovsk crisis? No! In March 1919 Lenin again repeated:

"We do not live merely in a State but in a system of states and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME IS INCONCEIVABLE. In the end one or the other must triumph."—(Vol. 16, page 102).

A year later, April 7, 1920, Lenin reiterates:

"Capitalism, if taken on an international scale, is even now, NOT ONLY IN A MILITARY BUT ALSO IN AN ECONOMIC SENSE, stronger than

the Soviet government. WE MUST BASE OUR POLICY ON THIS FUNDAMENTAL IDEA WHICH WE MUST NEVER FORGET.”—(Vol. 17, page 102).

In the same year of 1920 we find again:

“World imperialism cannot live together with the triumphant social revolution.”—(Ibid., page 197).

On November 27, 1920, Lenin, in dealing with the question of concessions, said:

“We have now gone over from the arena of war to peace and we have not forgotten that war will come again. As long as we still have capitalism and socialism we cannot live peacefully—either one or the other will be the victor in the end. The obituary will have to be sung either over the death of world capitalism or the death of the Soviet Republic. Now we have only a respite in the war.”—(Ibid., page 398).

But perhaps the further existence of the Soviet Republic made Lenin “realize his mistake” and discard his disbelief “in the inner force” of the October revolution?

At the Third Congress of the Comintern, to wit, in July 1921, Lenin declared:

“We have obtained an extremely unstable, an extremely unsound, but nevertheless an equilibrium such in which the socialist republic can exist—OF COURSE NOT FOR A LONG TIME—in capitalist surroundings.”—(Theses on the Tactics of the C.P.S.U.).

Moreover, on July 5, 1921 Lenin squarely declared at the Congress:

“It was clear to us that without aid from the international worldwide revolution a victory of the proletarian revolution is impossible. Even before the revolution, and also after it, we thought that the revolution either IMMEDIATELY OR AT LEAST very soon will come also in other countries, in the more highly developed capitalist countries, OTHERWISE WE WILL PERISH. Notwithstanding this conviction, we did our utmost to preserve the Soviet

system under any circumstances and at all costs because we know that we are not working only for ourselves but also for the international revolution."
—(Vol. 18, part 1, page 321—Our emphasis)

How infinitely far are these words, so excellent for their simplicity and so permeated through and through with the spirit of internationalism, from the present self-sufficient epigone machinations.

At any rate, we have the right to ask wherein do all these utterances made by Lenin differ from the ideas I expressed in 1915 that the coming revolution in Russia or the coming socialist Germany will not be able to hold out alone if "isolated in the capitalist world"? The time of realization is different from that outlined not only in my but also in Lenin's predictions. But the main idea remains in full force even now and perhaps at the given moment more so than ever before. Instead of condemning this idea as the Seventh Plenum of the E. C. C. I. has done on the basis of an incompetent and unscrupulous speech, it must be included in the program of the Communist International.

In defense of the slogan of a Soviet United States of Europe we said in 1915 that the law of uneven development is in itself not an argument against it because the UNEVENNESS of historical development in relation to the difference countries and continents IS IN ITSELF UNEVEN. European countries develop unevenly in relation to each other. Nevertheless it can be maintained with absolute historical certainty that it will not be the fate of a single one of them, at least in the historical epoch under review, to run so far ahead in relation to the other countries as America has advanced in relation to Europe. For America there is one SCALE OF UNEVENNESS, for Europe there is another. 'Geographically and historically con-

ditions have predetermined such a close organic contact between the countries of Europe that by no means can they tear themselves out of it. The modern bourgeois governments of Europe are like murderers chained to one cart. The revolution in Europe, as has already been said, will, **IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS**, be of decisive importance also for America. But **DIRECTLY**, in the immediate historical course, a revolution in Germany will be of an immeasurably greater significance for France than for the United States of America. From this historically developed relationship follows also the political vitality of the slogan of a European Soviet Federation. We speak of its **RELATIVE** vitality because it stands to reason that this Federation will extend, through the great bridge of the Soviet Union, to Asia and will then effect an amalgamation of the World Socialist Republics. But this will be a second epoch or a further great chapter of the imperialist epoch, and when we enter it more closely we will also find the corresponding formulae necessary for it.

That the difference with Lenin in 1915 on the question of the United States of Europe was of a narrow tactical, and by its very essence, temporary character, can be proven without any difficulty by further quotations, but it is best proven by the further trend of events. In 1923 the Comintern officially adopted the slogan. If it is true that the slogan of the United States of Europe could not be accepted in 1915 on grounds of principle, as the authors of the draft program now maintain, then the Comintern had no right to adopt it eight years later. The law of uneven development, one should think, has not lost its force of action during these years.

The formulation of the question as outlined a-

bove follows from the dynamics of the revolutionary process taken as a whole. The international revolution is regarded as an inter-connected process which cannot be predicted in all its concreteness, but the general historical outlines of it are absolutely clear. Without understanding them a correct political orientation is entirely out of the question.

Matters, however, appear quite differently if we proceed from the idea of socialist development which transpires and is even being completed in one country. We have now a "theory" which teaches that it is possible to build up Socialism in one country and that the inter-relations of that country with the capitalist world can be built on the basis of "neutralization" of the world bourgeoisie (Stalin). Advancing this essentially national-reformist and not revolutionary international point of view, the necessity for the slogan of a United States of Europe falls away or is at least diminished. But this slogan is, from our viewpoint, important and vitally necessary precisely because it condemns the idea of an isolated socialist development. For the proletariat of every European country, even to a greater extent than for the U.S.S.R.—the difference is only of degree—it will be of the most vital necessity to carry the revolution to the neighbouring countries and to support insurrections in them with arms in hand not because of abstract international solidarity, which is in itself unable to move the classes, but because of the vital considerations which Lenin has formulated hundreds of times—namely, without TIMELY aid from the international revolution we will not be able to hold out. The slogan of the Soviet United States corresponds with the dynamics of the proletarian revolution which does not

break out simultaneously in all countries, but passes on from country to country and requires closest class contact among them, especially on European territory, both with the object of defense against the most powerful foreign foes, and with economic objects.

One may, it is true, try to object, declaring that since the period of the Ruhr crisis which was the very last impulse for the adoption of that slogan, the latter has not played a big role in the agitation of the Communist Parties of Europe and has, so to speak, not taken root. But this is fully true also of the slogans of a Workers Soviet Government, etc., i. e., of all slogans to be used ON THE VERY EVE OF REVOLUTION. This may be explained by the fact that since the end of 1923, notwithstanding the mistaken political expectations of the Fifth Congress, the revolutionary movement on the European continent has been on the decline. But that is exactly why it is detrimental to build a program, or some of its parts, under the impressions received only in that period. It was not by mere accident that, despite all prejudices, the slogan of a Soviet United States of Europe was accepted precisely in 1923 when a revolutionary outburst was expected in Germany and when the question of State inter-relationships in Europe assumed an exceedingly burning character. Every new accentuation of the European, and, particularly, the world crisis, is grave enough to be able to raise the main political problems, and to advance again the slogan of the United States of Europe. It is therefore fundamentally wrong to keep silent over the slogan without having rejected it, that is, to keep it somewhere in reserve, to be used "in emergency." On questions of principle the keeping in reserve policy does not hold good.

3. THE CRITERION OF INTERNATIONALISM

The draft, as we already know, is making an effort to proceed in its construction from the viewpoint of world economy and its inner tendencies—a thing which deserves recognition. The **Pravda** is absolutely right when it says that therein lies the basic and fundamental difference between us and national patriotic Social Democracy. Only by taking world economy, which dominates over all its parts, as a basis can a program of the international proletarian Party be built. But precisely in analyzing the main tendencies of world development the draft displays not only an incompleteness, which depreciates its value, as has already been pointed out above, but also falls into gross one-sidedness leading to grave blunders.

The draft refers many times, and not always in the proper place, to the law of uneven development of capitalism as to the main and almost all-determining law of that development. Many mistakes in the draft including the fundamental error, are theoretically based on the one-sided and mistaken non-Marxian and non-Leninist interpretation of the law of uneven development.

In the first chapter the draft says:

“Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. This unevenness becomes still more accentuated and intensified in the epoch of imperialism.”

This is true. This formula in part condemns Stalin's formulation of the question, according to which Marx and Engels did not know the law of uneven development and that it was first discovered by Lenin. On September 15, 1925, Stalin wrote that Trotsky has no reason to refer to Engels

who wrote at a time "when THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION of the knowledge of the law of uneven development of capitalist countries." Unbelievable as these words may be, Stalin, one of the authors of the draft, has nevertheless repeated them more than once. The text of the draft, as we have seen, has taken a step forward in this respect. If however, we leave aside the correction of this elementary mistake, what is said in the draft about the law of uneven development is in essence one-sided and insufficient.

It would have been more correct first of all to say that the whole history of mankind is governed by the law of uneven development. Capitalism finds various sections of mankind at diverse stages of development with grave internal contradictions in each one of them. Great diversity in the various levels, and extraordinary unevenness in the rate of development of the different parts of mankind in the various periods of time, is the STARTING POINT of capitalism. The latter gains mastery gradually over the inherited unevenness. It breaks and alters it, employing thereby its own methods and its own ways. In contradistinction to the economic system which preceded it, capitalism is constantly aiming at economic expansion, at the penetration of new territories, the mitigation of economic differences, the conversion of hemmed-in provincial and national economies into a system of financial inter-relationships and thereby brings about their **approchement** and equalizes the economic and cultural levels of the most progressive and backward countries. Without this main process, the relative levelling out of, at first, Europe with Great Britain and then America with Europe, the industrialization of the colonies, the diminishing distance between India and Great Britain, with all the conse-

quences arising from the enumerated processes upon which is based not only the program of the Communist International, but also its very existence, would be inconceivable. By bringing the countries economically nearer to each other and levelling out their state of development, capitalism acts however, by methods of its OWN, that is by anarchistic methods which constantly undermine its own work by playing up one country against another and one branch of industry against another, developing some parts of world economy, while hampering and throwing back the development of some of its other parts. Only the merging of these two main tendencies—the centrifugal and centripetal, the levelling and equalizing tendencies which equally arise from the nature of capitalism—explains to us the live texture of the historical process of the last centuries.

Imperialism, thanks to the universality, penetrability and mobility, and the break-neck rapidity in the formation of finance capital as the driving force of imperialism, lends vigor to both of these tendencies. Imperialism links up incomparably more rapidly and more deeply the individual national and continental units into one, bringing them into closest and most vital dependence upon each other and rendering their economic methods, social forms and levels of development more identical. It attains this "aim" at the same time by means of such antagonist methods, such jumps, and such flights on the backward countries and districts, that the unification and levelling of world economy effected by it is upset by themselves even more rapidly and in a more convulsive manner than in preceding epochs. Only such a dialectical and not purely mechanical understanding of the law of uneven development can make possible the avoid-

ance of the fundamental error which the draft program, submitted to the Sixth Congress, has failed to avoid.

Right after the one-sided characterization of the law of uneven development pointed out by us, the draft program says:

"From this it follows that the international proletarian revolution must not be regarded as a single simultaneous and universal act. The victory of socialism is at first possible in a few or even in one capitalist country."

That the international revolutions of the proletariat cannot be a simultaneous act, of this, it goes without saying, there can in general be no dispute among grown up people after the experience of the October Revolution effected by the proletariat of a backward country under pressure of historical necessity, without having in the least waited for the proletariat of the advanced countries "to even out the front." To that extent the reference to the law of uneven development is absolutely correct and quite in place. But matters stand quite differently with the second half of the deduction—namely, the meaningless statement that the victory of Socialism is possible "in one capitalist country." To prove its point the draft program simply says—"From this it follows." One gets the impression that it follows from the law of uneven development. But it does not follow at all. "From this follows" something quite the contrary. If the historical process would be such that some countries develop not only unevenly, but even INDEPENDENTLY OF EACH OTHER, isolated from each other, then from the law of uneven development would no doubt follow the possibility of the building up of Socialism in one capitalist country—at first in the most advanced country

and then, as they mature, in the more backward ones. That was the customary, so to say, average idea of the transition to Socialism within the ranks of pre-war social democracy. This idea was precisely the theoretical basis of social patriotism. Of course the draft program does not hold this view. But it is inclined towards it.

The theoretical error of the draft lies in the fact that it seeks to deduct from the law of uneven development something which the law does not imply and cannot imply. Uneven or sporadic development of various countries constantly upsets but by no means **ELIMINATES** the growing economic ties and inter-dependence of these countries which the very next day after four years of hellish war were compelled to exchange their coal, bread and oil for powder and suspenders. On this basic question, the draft expresses the idea that historical development proceeds only on the basis of sporadic jumps while the economic basis which gives rise to these jumps, and upon which they occur, is entirely left out of sight by the authors of the draft, or is forcefully eliminated by them. This is done with the sole object of defending the undefendable theory of Socialism in one country.

After what has been said, it is not difficult to understand that the only correct way to formulate the question would be that Marx and Engels had even prior to the imperialist epoch arrived at the conclusion that on the one hand unevenness, i. e., sporadic historical development, stretches the proletarian revolution through a whole epoch in the course of which the nations will enter the revolutionary flood one after another, while, on the other hand, the organic inter-dependence of the various countries, the developing international division of

labor, excludes the possibility of building up Socialism in one country, the more so now in the present epoch when imperialism has developed, deepened and sharpened both these antagonistic tendencies and has rendered the Marxian doctrine that the Socialist revolution can begin only on a national basis while the building up of a Socialist society withing national boundaries is impossible, DOUBLY AND TREBLY TRUE. On this question, Lenin merely developed and put in concrete terms Marxist formulations and Marx's answer to this question.

Our Party program is entirely based on the underlying international conditions of the October revolution and Socialist construction. To prove this, one would only have to copy the theoretical part of our program. Here we will merely point out that when at the Eighth Congress of the Party, the late Podbelsky alluded that some formulations of the program refer only to the revolution in Russia, Lenin replied in his concluding speech on the question of the Party program (March 19, 1919) the following:

"Podbelsky raised objections to the paragraph which speaks of the PENDING social revolution. His argument is obviously unfounded because IN OUR PROGRAM IT IS A QUESTION OF THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION ON AN INTERNATIONAL SCALE."—(Vol. 16, page 113).

It will not be out of place to point out here that at about the same time Lenin suggested that our Party change its name from Communist Party of Russia to Communist Party so as to emphasize still further that is a party of INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION. I was the only one voting for that motion at the C. C. However, he did not bring the matter before the Congress in view of the foundation of the Third International. This

position proves that there could not even have been a thought of Socialism in one country at that time. That alone is the reason why the Party program does not condemn this "theory" but merely EXCLUDES it.

But the Young Communist League program which was adopted two years later had to issue a direct warning against home-bred illusions and narrow-mindedness on the question of proletarian revolution, with the object of training the youth in the spirit of internationalism. But we will still speak of this later.

The matter stands quite differently in the new draft program of the Comintern. In accordance with the revisionist evolution of its authors since 1924, the draft, as we have seen, chooses the directly opposite path. But the solution of the question of Socialism in one country in one way or another determines the significance of the WHOLE draft as a Marxian or a revisionist document.

Of course the draft program carefully, persistently and severally puts forward, emphasizes and explains the difference between the Communist and reformist formulation of questions.

But these assurances do not solve the problem. We have a situation something like that of a ship which is supplied and even overloaded with numerous Marxian mechanisms and appliances while its mainsail is raised so that it is purposely opened for all revisionist and reformist winds. Those who have learned from the experience of the last three decades and particularly from the marvelous experience of China during the recent years have learned to understand the powerful dialectical inter-dependence between the class struggle and programatical Party documents, will

understand when we say that the new revisionist sail can turn to naught all the safety appliances of Marxism and Leninism. That is why we are compelled to dwell in greater detail on this cardinal question which will for a long time determine the development and destiny of the Communist International.

4.—THE THEORETICAL TRADITION OF THE PARTY.

The draft program used with deliberate intention the expression "victory of Socialism in one country" so as to secure the external, purely verbal, identification of its text with Lenin's article of 1915, which has so ruthlessly, not to say criminally, been misused during the discussion on the question of building up a Socialist society in one country. The draft employs the same method elsewhere by "alluding" to Lenin's words as a confirmation. Such is the "methodology of the draft."

Of the great wealth of Marxian literature and the treasure of Lenin's works—directly ignoring everything that Lenin said and wrote and everything that he did, ignoring the Party program and the program of the Young Communist League, ignoring the opinions expressed by all Party leaders, without exception, in the the entire epoch of the October Revolution, when the question stood categorically (and categorically to what extent!) ignoring what the authors of the program themselves, Stalin and Bucharin, said up to 1924 inclusive—altogether two quotations from Lenin, one from his article on the United States of Europe written in 1915 and another from his unfinished posthumous publication on cooperation written in 1923, have been used in defense of the theory of national socialism which was created to meet the exigencies of the struggle against so-called "Trotskyism" at the end of 1924 or the beginning of 1925. Everything that disproves these two quotations of a few lines—the whole of Marxism and Leninism—is simply set aside. These two artificially snatched

out and grossly and epigonically misinterpreted quotations are taken as a basis of the new purely revisionist theory which is unbounded from the viewpoint of its political consequences. We are witnessing the efforts to graft, by scholastic and sophist methods, to the Marxian trunk, an absolutely alien branch which may be grafted but will inexorably poison and kill the whole tree.

At the Seventh Plenum of the E. C. C. I., Stalin declared (not for the first time):

“The question of Socialist economic construction in one country was for the FIRST time advanced in the Party by Lenin in 1915.” (Stenographic report of the Seventh Plenum. Our emphasis).

Thus it is admitted here that prior to 1915 the question of Socialism in one country was unknown. Stalin and Bucharin do not venture to encroach upon the entire Marxian tradition on the question of the international character of the proletarian revolution. We will take note of this.

However, let us see what Lenin said “for the first time” in 1915 in contradistinction to what Marx, Engels and Lenin himself had said prior to that. In 1915 Lenin said:

“Uneven economic and political development is an unconditional law of capitalism. From here it follows that the triumph of Socialism is, to begin with, possible in several or even in only one individual capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and ORGANIZED SOCIALIST PRODUCTION, would be up in arms against the rest of the capitalist world, attracting oppressed classes of the other countries to its side, causing insurrections in those countries against the capitalists and the acting in case of need, even with military power against the exploiting classes and their governments.”—(Vol. 13, page 133. Our emphasis).

What did Lenin have in mind? That the victory of Socialism, that is, the establishment of the

dictatorship of the proletariat, is possible at first in one country, which, because of this very fact, will stand up against capitalism. The proletarian State, in order to be able to resist an attack and to undertake a revolutionary offensive on its own, will at first have to "organize Socialist production", i. e., it will have to organize the operation of the factories taken from the capitalists. That is all. The "victory of Socialism" was, as is well-known, first accomplished in Russia, and the First Workers' State, in order to defend itself against world intervention, had first of all "to organize Socialist production." By the victory of Socialism in one country, Lenin consequently did not cherish the fantasy of a self-sufficing Socialist society, and in a backward country at that, but something that was much more realistic, namely, that which the October revolution has accomplished in our country in the first period of its existence.

Does this, perhaps, need to be proven? There are so many proofs for that, that the only difficulty we have is in choosing the best.

In the theses on war and peace (January 7, 1918) Lenin spoke of the

"Necessity of a certain period of time, AT LEAST SEVERAL MONTHS, FOR THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM in Russia...—Vol. 15, page 64).

At the beginning of the same year, i. e., 1918. Lenin wrote in his article entitled "As to Left Wing Childishness and Petty Bourgeois Tendencies," directed against Bucharin, the following:

"If, let us say, State capitalism could be established here within six months, that would be a tremendous achievement and the surest guarantee that within a year SOCIALISM will be definitely established and have become invincible."—(Vol. 18, part 2, page 8. Our emphasis).

How could Lenin set such a short period for the

"definite establishment" of Socialism? What material-productive and social content did he put into these words?

This question will at once appear in a different light if you recall that on April 29, 1918, Lenin said in his report to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Government:

"It is hardly to be expected that our next generation, which will be more highly developed, will effect a complete transition to Socialism."—(Ibid., page 240).

On December 3, 1919, at the Congress of Com-munes and Artels, Lenin spoke even more definitely, saying:

"We know that we cannot establish a Socialist system at the present time. It will be well if our children and perhaps our grandchildren will be able to establish it."—(Vol. 16, page 398).

In which of these two cases was Lenin right? Was it when he spoke of the "definite establishment of Socialism" within twelve months, or when he left it, not for our children but our grandchildren to establish the "socialist order."?

Lenin was right in both cases for he had in mind two entirely different and incommensurable stages of Socialist construction.

By the "definite establishment of Socialism" in the first case Lenin meant not the building up of a Socialist society within a year or within "several months," that is, he did not mean that the classes will be done away with, that the contradictions between town and country will be eliminated; he meant the RESTORATION OF PRODUCTION IN THE FACTORIES IN THE HANDS OF THE PROLETARIAN STATE, and the possibility to exchange products between town and country. The very shortness of the term is in itself a

sure key to an understanding of the whole perspective.

Of course even for this limited and immediate task too short a term was set at the beginning of 1918. It is this purely practical "miscalculation" that Lenin derided at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern when he said "we were more foolish then than we are now." But "we" had a correct view of the general perspective and did not for a moment believe that it is possible to set up a complete "Socialist order" in the course of twelve months, and in a backward country at that.

The attainment of this main and final aim—the construction of a Socialist society—was left by Lenin to three whole generations—ourselves, our children and our grandchildren.

Is it not clear that in his article of 1915 Lenin meant by the organization of "Socialist production," not the setting up of a Socialist society but an immeasurably more elementary task which has already been realized by us in the U. S. S. R.? Otherwise one would have to come to the absurd conclusion that, according to Lenin, the proletarian party, having captured power, "postpones" the revolutionary war until the third generation.

Such—that is, truly said—is the position of the main stronghold of the new theory as far as the 1915 quotation is concerned. However, it is even more sad when we know that Lenin wrote this passage not in application to Russia. He spoke of Europe in contradistinction to Russia. This follows not only from the content of the quoted passage dedicated to the question of the United States of Europe, but also from Lenin's entire position at the time. A few months hence, November 20, 1915, Lenin wrote specially on Russia, saying:

"The task of the proletariat follows obviously from this actual state of affairs. That task is a relentless

heroic revolutionary struggle against the monarchy (the slogans of the January conference of 1912—'three stages'), a struggle which would attract all democratic masses, that is, first and foremost the peasants. At the same time a ruthless struggle must be waged against chauvinism, a struggle FOR THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN EUROPE in alliance with its proletariat... The war crisis HAS STRENGTHENED the economic and political factors driving the petty bourgeoisie, including the peasantry, towards the Left. Therein lies the objective basis of the absolute possibility of a victory of the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION in Russia. That the OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS FOR A SOCIALIST REVOLUTION HAVE FULLY MATURED IN WESTERN EUROPE there is no need to prove. This was recognized before the war by all influential Socialists of all advanced countries." —(Vol. 13, page 212. Our emphasis).

Thus, in 1915, Lenin clearly spoke of a democratic revolution in Russia and of a Socialist Revolution in Western Europe. In passing, as of something which is self-evident, he mentions that in Western Europe, distinct from Russia, in contradistinction to Russia, the conditions for a Socialist revolution have "fully matured." But this quotation—one of many—which squarely and directly refers to Russia, the authors of the new theory, the authors of the draft program, simply ignore as they ignore hundreds of other passages, as they ignore all of Lenin's works. Instead of taking notice of this, they, as we have seen, take another passage which refers to Western Europe, ascribe to it a meaning which it cannot and does not mean to have, attach this ascribed meaning to Russia, a country which the passage did not have in mind, and on this "foundation" they build their new theory.

What was Lenin's position on this question immediately before the October period? On leaving Switzerland after the February revolution in 1917,

Lenin addressed a letter to the Swiss workers in which he declared:

"Russia is a peasant country, it is one of the most backward countries of Europe. Socialism cannot be IMMEDIATELY triumphant there. But the peasant character of the country with the huge funds of land in the hands of the aristocracy and land-owners, CAN, on the basis of the experiences of 1905, give a tremendous impetus to the bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia and make our revolution a PRELUDE to the world Socialist revolution, a STEP towards it... The Russian proletarian party cannot by its own forces VICTORIOUSLY COMPETE the Socialist revolution. But it can give the Russian revolution dimensions such as will create the most favorable conditions for it, such as will in a certain sense BEGIN it. It can facilitate matters for the entrance into a decisive battle on the part of its MAIN and most reliable ally, the EUROPEAN and American socialist proletariat."— (Vol. 14, part 2, page 407).

All elements of the question are contained in these few lines. If Lenin believed in 1915, in time of war and reaction, as they try to convince us now, that the proletariat of Russia can alone build up Socialism so as, when it will have accomplished this work, to be able to declare war on the bourgeois States, how can Lenin, at the beginning of 1917, after the February revolution, speak so categorically about the impossibility for backward peasant Russia to build up Socialism with its own forces? One must at least to some extent be logical and, to be candid, have some respect for Lenin.

It would be superfluous to add more quotations. To give an integral outline of Lenin's economic and political views conditioned by the international character of the Socialist revolution, would require an independent investigation which would include many subjects except that of building up a self-sufficing Socialist society in one country, for Lenin did not know this subject.

However, we feel compelled to mention here one more article by Lenin—that “On Cooperation”—as the draft program seems to quote it extensively, i. e., uses some of its expressions with a purpose which has nothing in common with that of the article. We have in mind the fifth chapter of the draft program which says that the workers of the Soviet Republics

“possess all the necessary and sufficient MATERIAL prerequisites in the country... for the complete construction of Socialism.”—(Our emphasis).

If the article dictated by Lenin during his illness and published after his death really says that the Soviet State possesses all the necessary and sufficient MATERIAL, that is, first of all PRO-
DUCTIVE, prerequisites for an independent construction of complete Socialism, one would only have to surmise that either Lenin slipped in his dictation or the stenographer made a mistake in deciphering her notes. The one or the other is at any rate more probable than Lenin’s abandonment of Marxism and his own teachings in two hasty strokes. Fortunately, however, there is not the slightest need whatever for such an explanation. The remarkable, although incomplete article “On Cooperation,” bound up by unity of thought with the other no less remarkable articles of his last period which constitute, so to say, a chapter of an unfinished book dealing with THE PLACE OCCUPIED BY THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION IN THE CHAIN OF REVOLUTIONS IN THE WEST AND EAST, does not by any means speak of the things which the revisionists of Leninism so light-mindedly ascribe to it.

In that article Lenin explains that the “trading” cooperatives can and must entirely change their social role in the workers’ state and that by a correct policy they may direct the merging of private

peasant interests with the general state interests along Socialist channels. Lenin substantiates this irrefutable idea as follows:

"In reality, power of the state over all large scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, an alliance of that proletariat with the millions of small and dwarfish peasants, security of proletarian leadership in relation to the peasants —is this not all that is necessary for the cooperatives, the cooperatives alone, which we have formerly treated as mere traders and which, from a certain viewpoint, we still have the right to treat them as such even now under NEP, is this not all that is necessary for the complete construction of Socialist Society? It is not yet the construction of Socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and sufficient for this construction."—(Vol 18, part 2, page 140).

The text of the passage which comprises an unfinished sentence ("of the cooperatives alone"?) irrefutably proves that we have before us an uncorrected draft which was dictated and not written. It is the more inadmissible to cling to a few individual words of the text rather than to try to get a general idea of the article. Fortunately, however, even the LETTER of the cited passage, and not only its SPIRIT, grants no one the right to misuse it in the manner it is being misused by the authors of the draft program. Speaking of the "necessary and sufficient" prerequisites Lenin strictly limits his subject in this article. He deals in it only with the question as to the ways and means by which we will reach Socialism through the numerous and disjointed peasant enterprises without new class upheavals, having the prerequisites of the Soviet regime as our basis. The article is entirely devoted to the SOCIO-ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS of the transition from small private commodity economy to collective economy but not with the MATERIAL PRODUCTIVE conditions of that transition.

If the European proletariat were victorious to-day and would come to our assistance with its technique, the question of cooperation raised by Lenin as a socio-organizational method of coordination of private with social interests would still retain its significance. Cooperation points the way through which advanced technique including electricity can reorganize and unite the millions of peasant enterprises under the Soviet regime; but cooperation cannot be substituted for technique and does not create that technique. Lenin does not merely speak of the necessary and sufficient prerequisites in general, but, as we have seen, definitely enumerates them. They are: 1) "power of the State over all large scale means of production" (an uncorrected phrase); 2) "State power in the hands of the proletariat"; 3) "an alliance of that proletariat with the millions of . . . peasants"; 4) "security of proletarian leadership in relation to the peasants" . . . It is only after the enumeration of these PURELY POLITICAL conditions—nothing is said here about material conditions—that Lenin arrives at his conclusion that "this" (that is, the enumerated) "is all that is necessary and sufficient" for the building up of a Socialist society. "All that is necessary and sufficient" FROM A POLITICAL ASPECT, but no more.

But, adds Lenin right there and then, "it is not yet the construction of Socialist society." Why? Because political conditions alone, although they be sufficient do not solve the whole problem. The cultural question still remains. "ONLY" this—says Lenin—emphasizing the word "only" and putting it in quotation marks in order to show the tremendous importance of the prerequisites which we do not have. That culture is bound up with technique, Lenin knew as well as we. "To be

cultural"—he brings back the revisionist to earth—"a certain MATERIAL basis is necessary." (Ibid., page 145).

It will suffice to mention the problem of electrification which Lenin, we will mention in passing, purposely linked up with the question of the international social revolution. The struggle for culture with the possession of the "necessary and sufficient" political (BUT NOT MATERIAL) prerequisites, would exhaust our work were it not for the question of the uninterrupted and irreconcilable economic, political, military and cultural struggle of the country which is engaged in the building of a Socialist society on a backward basis with world capitalism which is on its decline but is technically powerful.

"I am ready to state"—emphasizes Lenin particularly towards the end of the article—"that the center of gravity for us is being transferred to cultural work were it not for the international relations, were it not for the duty to fight for our positions on an international scale."—(Ibid., page 24).

Such is Lenin's real idea if we analyze the article on cooperation, even if isolated from all his other works. How else can we style, if not as a falsification, the formula of the authors of the draft who deliberately take Lenin's words about our possession of "necessary and sufficient" prerequisites and add to them the basic material prerequisites although Lenin definitely speaks of the material prerequisites in parenthesis, saying that it is just what we do not have and what we must still gain in our struggle "for our position on an international scale," that is, in connection with the international proletarian revolution?

That is how matters stand with the second and last stronghold of the theory. We purposely did not take here those articles and speeches written

and uttered during the entire course of 1905-1923 in which Lenin says and repeats most categorically that without a victorious revolution we are doomed to failure, that it is impossible to defeat the bourgeoisie economically in one country, particularly a backward country, that the task of building up a Socialist society is in its very essence an international task from which Lenin drew perhaps "pessimistic" conclusions for the promulgators of the new national reactionary utopia but which are sufficiently optimistic from the viewpoint of revolutionary internationalism. We concentrate our argument here only on the passages which the authors of the draft have themselves chosen and which are supposed to create the "necessary and sufficient" prerequisites for their utopia, and yet we see that their whole structure collapses. All one has to do is but touch it.

However, we consider it in place to present at least one of Lenin's direct statements on the question under consideration, which does not need any comment and will not permit any misinterpretation:

"WE HAVE EMPHASIZED IN MANY OF OUR WORKS, IN ALL OUR SPEECHES AND IN THE WHOLE OF OUR PRESS that matters in Russia are not such as IN THE ADVANCED CAPITALIST COUNTRIES, that we have in Russia a minority of industrial workers and an overwhelming majority of small agrarians. The social revolution in such a country can be finally successful only on two conditions: First, on the condition that it is given TIMELY support by the social revolution of one or several advanced countries... Second, that there be an agreement between the proletariat which establishes the dictatorship or holds State power in its hands and the majority of the peasantry.

"We know that ONLY AN AGREEMENT WITH THE PEASANTRY CAN SAVE THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA SO LONG AS THE REVOLUTION IN OTHER COUN-

TRIES HAS NOT ARRIVED."—(Lenin, Vol. 18, part 1, pages 137-138. Our emphasis).

We hope that this passage is sufficiently instructive. Firstly, Lenin himself emphasizes in it that the ideas which he advanced have developed "in many of our works, in all our speeches, and in the whole of our press"; secondly, this outlook was uttered by Lenin not in 1915, two years before the October Revolution, but in 1921, the fourth year after the October revolution.

As far as Lenin is concerned, we venture to think that the question is clear enough. One only has to ask now—what was formerly the opinion of the authors of the draft program as to the basic questions now in hand?

On this question, Stalin said in November 1926:

"The Party always took as its starting point the idea that the victory of Socialism in one country means the possibility to build up Socialism in that country, and that this task can be accomplished with the forces of one country."—(*Pravda*, September 12, 1926).

We already know that the Party NEVER TOOK THIS AS A STARTING POINT. On the contrary "in many of our works, in all our speeches and in the whole of our press," the Party proceeded from the contrary position which found its highest expression in the program of the C.P. S.U. But one would hope that at least Stalin himself "always" held this false view that "Socialism can be built up with the forces of one country." We will see.

What Stalin thought of this question in 1905 and 1915 we have absolutely no means of knowing as there are no documents on the matter whatever. But in 1924 Stalin gave an outline of Lenin's views on the building up of Socialism, as follows:

"The overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie

and the putting up of a proletarian government in one country does not yet guarantee the complete victory of Socialism. The main task of Socialism—the ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST PRODUCTION—still remains ahead. Can this task be accomplished, can the final victory of Socialism in one country be attained, without the joint efforts of the proletariat of several advanced countries? No, this IS IMPOSSIBLE. To overthrow the bourgeoisie, the efforts of one country are sufficient—the victory of our revolution bears this out. For the final victory of Socialism, FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION, THE EFFORTS OF ONE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY OF SUCH A PEASANT COUNTRY AS RUSSIA, ARE INSUFFICIENT. For this the efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries are necessary...

"Such, on the whole, are the characteristic features of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution."—(Stalin, "Lenin and Leninism," Russian 1924 edition, pages 40-41).

One must admit that the "characteristic features of Lenin's theory" are outlined here quite correctly. In the later editions of Stalin's book this passage was altered to read in just the opposite way and the "characteristic features of Lenin's theory" were developed within a year as... Trotskyism. The Seventh Plenum of the E.C.C.I. passed its decision, not on the basis of the 1924 edition but of the 1926 edition.

That is how the matter stands with Stalin. It could not be any sadder than that. One could, it is true, reconcile himself with this, were it not for the fact that matters are just as sad with regard to the Seventh Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

There is one hope left and that is that at least Bucharin, the real author of the draft program, "always proceeded" from the possibility of the realization of Socialism in one country. We shall see.

Here is what Bucharin wrote on the subject in 1917:

"Revolutions are the locomotives of history. The irreplaceable engineer of that locomotive can even in backward Russia be only the proletariat, but the proletariat cannot stay within the limits of the property relations of bourgeois society. It marches to power and towards Socialism. However, this mission which is being 'put on the order of the day' in Russia cannot be fulfilled 'within national boundaries.' Here the working class meets with an insurmountable wall"—(Take note: "an insurmountable wall."—L. T.)—"which can be broken through only by the battering ram of the INTERNATIONAL WORKERS' REVOLUTION."—(Bucharin, "Class Struggle and Revolution in Russia," page 34, Russian edition).

One could not express himself more clearly. Such were the views held by Bucharin in 1917, two years after Lenin's alleged "change" in 1915. Perhaps the October Revolution taught Bucharin differently? We shall see.

In 1919, Bucharin wrote on the subject of the "Proletarian Dictatorship in Russia and the World Revolution" in the theoretical organ of the Comintern, saying:

"Under existing WORLD economy and the connections between its parts, with the simultaneous inter-dependence of the various national bourgeois groups, IT STANDS TO REASON" (our emphasis) "that the struggle in one country cannot end without a decisive victory of one or the other side in SEVERAL civilized countries."

At that time this was even "self-evident." Further:

"In the Marxian and quasi-Marxian pre-war literature, the question was many times raised as to whether the victory of Socialism is possible in one country. Most of the writers replied to this question in the negative" (And what about Lenin in 1915?—L. T.) "from which one does not at all conclude that it is impossible or inadmissible to start the revolution and to capture power in one country."

Exactly! In the same article we read:

"The period of great development of the productive forces can begin only with the victory of the proletariat in several large countries... From here it follows that an all-round development of the world revolution and the formation of a strong economic alliance of the industrial countries with Soviet Russia is necessary." (N. Bucharin, "Proletarian Dictatorship in Russia and the World Revolution," *The Communist International*, No. 5, 1919).

Bucharin's statement that a rise in the productive forces, that is, real Socialist development, will begin only after the victory of the proletariat of the advanced countries of Europe—why, that is exactly the phrase which was used as a basis of all acts of indictment against "Trotskyism," including also the indictment read at the Seventh Plenum of the E.C.C.I. It is only strange that Bucharin, whose only salvation lies in his short memory, read the indictment. Side by side with this comical circumstance, there is also a tragic one—among those indicted was also Lenin, who expressed, tens of times, the very same elementary idea.

Finally, in 1921, six years after Lenin's alleged change of 1915, and four years after the October Revolution, the program of the Young Communist League, approved by the Central Committee headed by Lenin and drawn up by a Commission under Bucharin's leadership, says in paragraph 4:

"In the U.S.S.R. political power is already in the hands of the working class. In the course of three years of heroic struggle against world capitalism it maintained and strengthened its Soviet Government. Russia, although it possesses enormous natural resources, is, nevertheless, from an industrial point of view, a backward country, in which a petty-bourgeois population predominates. It can arrive at Socialism only through the world proletarian revolution, which epoch of development we have now entered."

This paragraph of the program of the Young Communist League—not of an accidental article, but of a program—renders the attempts of the authors of the draft to prove that the Party “always” held the construction of a Socialist society possible in one country and precisely in Russia, ridiculous and inadequate. If “always,” why is it that Bucharin wrote such a paragraph in the program of the Young Communist League and why was Stalin looking on? How could Lenin and the whole Central Committee voice such a heresy? How was it that no one in the Party noticed this “trifle” or raised a voice against it? Does this not look like a vicious joke which is a direct mockery of the Party, its history and the Comintern? Is it not high time to put a stop to this? Is it not high time to tell the revisionists: Dare not hide behind Lenin and the theoretical traditions of Marxism?

5. WHERE IS THE "SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC DEVIATION"

What I have said is more than sufficient to characterize Bucharin's theoretical position of yesterday and today. To characterize his political methods one must recall that having selected in the statements written by the Opposition those which are absolutely analogous with those which he himself (IN THIS CASE in full agreement with Lenin) wrote up to 1925, Bucharin erected on their basis the theory of our "Social Democratic Deviation." It appears that in the central question concerning the relations between the October Revolution and the international revolution, the Opposition thinks . . . the same as Otto Bauer, who does not admit the possibility of Socialist construction in Russia. One would think that printing has been discovered only in 1924 and that everything that happened before that has been forgotten. It is all trusted to short memory.

However, on the question of the nature of the October Revolution, the Comintern settled its accounts with Otto Bauer and other philistines of the Second International at the Fourth Congress. In my speech (on the question of the New Economic Policy and the prospects of world revolution) authorized by the Central Committee, Otto Bauer's position was outlined in a manner which expressed the views of our Central Committee of the time; it did not give rise to any objections at the Congress and, I think, it fully holds good today. So far as Bucharin is concerned, he declined to deal with the political side of the problem since "many comrades, including Lenin and Trotsky, had already spoken on the subject"; in other words, Bucharin agreed with my speech. Here is what I said at the Fourth Congress about Otto Bauer:

"The Social Democratic theoreticians, who, on the

one hand recognize in their holiday articles that capitalism, particularly in Europe, has outlived its usefulness and has become a brake on historical development, and who on the other hand express the conviction that the evolution of Soviet Russia inevitably leads to the triumph of bourgeois democracy, fall into the most pitiful and flat contradiction of which these stupid and conceited confusionists are worthy. **THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY IS CALCULATED ON CERTAIN DEFINITE CONDITIONS OF TIME AND SPACE. IT IS A MANOEUVRE OF THE WORKERS' STATE WHICH EXISTS IN CAPITALIST SURROUNDINGS AND DEFINITELY CALCULATES ON THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE...** Such a factor as time cannot be left out of consideration in political calculations. If we admit that capitalism will really be able to exist in Europe for another hundred or fifty years and that Soviet Russia will have to adapt itself to it in its economic policy, then the question solves itself automatically because, by recognizing this, we presuppose the crushing of the proletarian revolution in Europe and the rise of a new epoch of capitalist revival. On what basis? If Otto Bauer has discovered in the life of present-day Austria any miraculous signs of capitalist revival then all that can be said is that the fate of Russia is pre-determined. But so far we do not see any miracles, and we do not believe in such. From our viewpoint, if the European bourgeoisie will hold power in the course of several decades, it will under the present world conditions signify not a new capitalist bloom, but economic stagnation and the cultural decline of Europe. That such a process might be able to draw Soviet Russia into the abyss can, generally speaking, not be denied. Whether she would have to go through a state democracy, or adopt some other forms, is a question of secondary importance. But we see no reason whatever, for the adoption of Spengler's philosophy. We definitely look forward to a revolutionary development in Europe. **THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY IS MERELY AN ADAPTATION TO THE RATE OF THAT DEVELOPMENT.**" (L. Trotsky. Five Years of the Comintern, Social Democratic Criticism).

This formulation of the questions brings us back to the point from which we started in dealing with the draft program, namely, that in the epoch of imperialism one cannot regard the fate of one country in any other way but by taking as a background the tendencies of world development, in which the individual country with all its national peculiarities is included and to which it is subordinated, as a whole. Theoreticians of the Second International exclude the U.S.S.R. from the world unit and from the imperialist epoch; they apply to the U.S.S.R., as an isolated country, the vague criterion of economic "maturity"; they declare that the U.S.S.R. is not ready for independent social construction, and draw the conclusion of the inevitability of a capitalist degeneration of the Workers' State.

The authors of the draft program adopt the same theoretical ground and accept the metaphysical methodology of the Social Democratic theoreticians as a whole. They too "abstract" from the world entity and from the imperialist epoch. They start out from the fiction of isolated development. They apply to the national phase of the world revolution a vague economic criterion. But their "sentence" is different. The "leftism" of the authors of the draft lies in the fact that they turn the Social Democratic evaluation inside out. However, the position of the theoreticians of the Second International, no matter how much one would remodel it, is equally bad. One must take Lenin's position which simply REMOVES Bauer's position and Bauer's prognosis as the exercises of an elementary class.

That is how matters stand with the "Social Democratic deviation." Not we but the authors of the draft should consider themselves related to Bauer.

6. THE DEPENDENCE OF THE U.S.S.R. ON WORLD ECONOMY

The precursor of the present prophets of the national socialist society was no other than Herr Vollmar.* Describing in his article entitled "An Isolated Socialist State" the prospect of independent socialist construction in Germany, the proletariat of which country advanced much further than that of progressive Britain, Vollmar, in 1878, refers clearly and quite correctly in several places to the law of uneven development which, according to Stalin, Marx and Engels did not know. On the basis of that law Vollmar arrives in 1878 at the irrefutable conclusion that:

"Under the existing conditions, which will retain their forces also in the future, it can be foreseen that a simultaneous victory of socialism in all cultural countries, is absolutely out of the question."

Developing this idea still further, Vollmar says:

"Thus we have come to the ISOLATED socialist State which is, I hope I have proven, although not the only possible, the MOST PROBABLE WAY."

Inasmuch as by the term of isolated State one must understand one State under a proletarian dictatorship, Vollmar expressed an irrefutable idea which was well-known to Marx and Engels and which Lenin expressed in the quoted article of 1915.

But then comes already something which is purely Vollmar's idea which, by the way, is by

* George von Vollmar, son of an aristocratic Bavarian family, was one of the leaders of the German Social Democracy in the days of Bebel and the elder Liebknecht. He opposed the Marxian contentions on the questions of the concentration of capital, on the agrarian problem, and the like. He was one of the fathers of the "evolutionary" reformist movement in the German Party. During the days of the Bismarck anti-Socialist law, he served a term in the Zwickau prison, where he wrote a work on the question of an isolated Socialist State.—Ed.

far not as one-sided and wrongly formulated as the formulation of our sponsors of the theory of socialism in one country. In his construction, Vollmar took as a starting point the supposition that socialist Germany will have live economic relations with world capitalist economy, having at the same time the advantage of possessing a highly-developed technique and a low cost of production. This construction is based on the prospect of a PEACEFUL co-habitation of the socialist and capitalist systems. But inasmuch as socialism must, as as it progresses, constantly reveal its colossal productive advantages the necessity for a world revolution will fall away in itself, as socialism will be able to settle accounts with capitalism by the sale of goods more cheaply on the market.

The authors of the first draft program and one of the authors of the second draft, Bucharin, in their construction of socialism in one country, proceed entirely from the idea of an isolated self-sufficing economy. In Bucharin's article entitled "As to the Nature of our Revolution and the Possibility of Successful Socialist Construction in the U.S.S.R." (*The Bolshevik*, No. 192, 1926), which is the last word in scholastics multiplied by sophistry, all arguments are kept within the limits of isolated economy. The chief and only argument is the following:

"Once we have 'all that is necessary and sufficient' for the building up of socialism, it follows that in the process of building of socialism there can be no such a point at which its further construction would become impossible. If we have in our country such a combination of forces that in relation to each past year, we are marching ahead with a greater relative strength of the socialist sector of economy and the socialized sectors of economy grow faster than the private capitalist sectors, then we are entering every subsequent new year with a greater balance of power."

This argumentation is comprehensible "ONCE we have all that is necessary and sufficient," SO. . . we have it. Starting out from a point which needs to be proven, Bucharin builds up a complete system of self-sufficing socialist economics without any entrances or exits to it. As to the external environment, that is, the rest of the world, Bucharin as well as Stalin, think of them only from the viewpoint of intervention. When Bucharin speaks in his article about the necessity to "abstract" from the international factor, he has in mind not the world market but military intervention. Bucharin does not have to abstract from the world market because he simply forgets about it in his structure. In harmony with this scheme Bucharin championed at the Fourteenth Congress the idea that if we will not be interfered with by intervention we will build up socialism "although with the speed of a tortoise." The uninterrupted struggle between the two systems, the fact that socialism can be based only on the highest productive forces, in a word, Marxian dynamics in displacing one social form by another on the basis of the growing productive forces—all this has been blotted out. Revolutionary historical dialectics has been displaced by a skinflint reactionary Utopia of encircled socialism, built on a low technique developing within national boundaries, connected with the external world only by its fear of intervention. The refusal to accept this miserable caricature on Marx's and Lenin's doctrine has been declared a "Social Democratic deviation." In the quoted article, this characterization of our views, has, in general, for the first time been advanced and "substantiated." History will mark that we have fallen into a "Social Democratic deviation" for failing to recog-

nize an inferior version of Vollmar's theory of socialism in one country. The proletariat of Czarist Russia could not have taken power in October if Russia had not been a link, the weakest, but yet a link, of the chain of WORLD economy. The capture of power by the proletariat has not in the least excluded the Soviet Republic from the international "division of labor" set up by capitalism.

Like the wise owl which comes out only in the dusk, the theory of socialism in one country has appeared at the moment when our industry, which exhausts ever greater parts of the old fixed capital, two-thirds of which is a crystallization of the dependence of our industry on world economics, has manifested an acute demand for a renewing and extension of relations with the world market and when the questions of foreign trade have arisen in their full scope before our economic directors.

At the Eleventh Congress, that is, at the last Congress at which Lenin had the opportunity to speak to the Party, he issued the warning that the Party will have to face another examination:

"An examination which the Russian and INTERNATIONAL MARKET TO WHICH WE ARE SUBORDINATED, WITH WHICH WE ARE CONNECTED AND FROM WHICH WE CAN NOT ESCAPE, WILL MAKE US GO THROUGH."

Nothing strikes the theory of an isolated "complete" socialism such a death blow as the simple fact that the figures of our foreign trade have in recent years become the corner stone of the figures of our economic plans. The most "stringent place" of our economy, including our industry, is our import which depends entirely on the export. And inasmuch as the power of resistance is always measured by the weakest link, the extent of

our economic plans is measured by the extent of our import.

In the journal **Planned Economy** (a theoretical organ of the State Planning Commission) we read in an article devoted to the system of planning, that

"in drawing up our estimates for this year we had to take our export and import balance as a starting point; we had to orientate ourselves on that in our plans for the various industries and consequently for industry in general and particularly for the construction of new industrial enterprises, etc., etc."—(January 1927, page 27).

The methodological approach of the State Planning Commission says without any doubt, for all who have ears to hear, that the estimate figures determine the tendency and tempo of our economic development but that these estimate figures are already controlled by world economy; not because we have become weaker, but because having becoming stronger we have outgrown the narrow enclosed circle.

The capitalist world shows us by its export and import figures that it has other means of persuasion than those of military intervention. Inasmuch as productivity of labor and the productivity of a social system as a whole is measured on the market by the correlation of prices, to the same extent it is not so much military intervention as the intervention of cheaper capitalist commodities that constitute the greatest danger to Soviet economy. This alone shows that it is by no means merely a question of an isolated economic victory over one's "own" bourgeoisie:

"The Socialist revolution which is meant for the whole world will by no means consist merely in a victory of the proletariat of each country over its own bourgeoisie." (Lenin, 1919, Vol. 16, page 388). It is a question of competition and of a life and

death struggle between two social systems one of which only commenced to build on backward productive forces and the other which still rests on productive forces of immeasurably greater strength.

Anyone who sees in the admission of our dependence on the world market (Lenin spoke directly of our SUBORDINATION to the world market) "pessimism," reveals thereby his own provincial petty-bourgeois feebleness in the face of the world market and the pitiful character of his country-bred optimism, hoping to hide from world economy behind a bush and to get along somehow with his own means.

The question of honor for the new theory has become the curious idea that the U.S.S.R. can perish from a military intervention, but by no means from its own economic backwardness. But inasmuch as in socialist society the readiness of the toiling masses to defend their country must be much greater than the readiness of the slaves of capitalism to attack that country, the question is why should a military intervention menace us with destruction? Is it because the enemy is TECHNICALLY immeasurably stronger? Bucharin admits the preponderance of the productive forces only in the military technical aspect. He does not want to understand that Ford's tractor is just as dangerous as the Creusot gun, with the only difference that whereas the gun can act only from time to time, the tractor brings its pressure to bear constantly. Besides, the tractor knows that a gun stands behind it, as a last resort.

We are the first Workers' State—a part of the world proletariat together with which we DEPEND upon world capital. The indifferent, neutral and bureaucratically castrated word, "connection" is set in motion only with the object of con-

cealing the extremely difficult and dangerous nature of these "connections." If we would produce according to the price of the world market, our dependence on the latter, without ceasing to be a dependence, would be of a much less severe character than it is now. But unfortunately this is not so. The very monopoly of foreign trade betrays the severity and the dangerous character of our dependence. The decisive importance of the monopoly in our socialist construction is a result precisely of the existing correlation of forces which is unfavorable to us. But one must not forget for a moment that the foreign trade only regulates our dependence upon the world market, but does not eliminate it.

"So long as our Soviet Republic," says Lenin, "will remain the only border land surrounded by the whole capitalist world, so long will it be an absolutely ridiculous fantasy and Utopia to think of our complete economic independence and of the disappearance of any of our dangers."—(Vol. 17, page 409).

The chief dangers arise consequently from the objective position of the U.S.S.R. as the "only borderland" in capitalist economy which is hostile to us. These dangers may, however, diminish or increase. This depends on the action of two factors—socialist construction on the one hand, and the development of capitalist economy on the other. The second factor of course, that is, the fate of world economy as a whole, is, **IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS**, of **DECISIVE** significance.

Can it happen—and in what particular case—that the productivity of our socialist system will constantly lag behind that of the capitalist system—which, **IN THE END** would inevitably lead to the downfall of the Socialist Republic? If we will manage properly our economy in the phase when it becomes necessary to create independently an

industrial basis with its incomparably higher demands to the management, then our productivity of labor will grow. Is it, however, inconceivable that the productivity of labor in the capitalist countries, or, more correctly, in the predominant capitalist countries, will grow faster than in our country? Without a clear answer to this question the meaningless and wordy statements that our tempo "is in itself" sufficient (let us forget the factitious philosophy about the "speed of the tortoise") are insolvent. But the very mentioning of the rivalry of two systems leads us to the arena of world economy and world politics, that is, to the arena of action and decision of the revolutionary International which includes also the Soviet Republic, but not by any means the self-sufficing Soviet Republic, which secures from time to time the support of the International. Before, however, taking up this question we will try to reveal its main contradiction, basing ourselves on the draft program.

7. THE ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES AND THE NATIONAL BOUNDARIES AS THE CAUSE OF THE REACTIONARY UTOPIAN THEORY OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY.

The theory of socialism in one country is confirmed as we have seen by means of several sophist interpretations of Lenin's expressions on the one hand and by a scholastic interpretation of the "law of uneven development" on the other. By giving a correct interpretation of the historical law as well as of the respective quotations we arrived at a directly opposite conclusion, that is, a conclusion at which Marx, Engels, Lenin and all of us including Stalin and Bucharin up to 1925, have arrived.

From the uneven sporadic development of capitalism follow the unsimultaneous, uneven and sporadic nature of the socialist revolution; from the extreme tensivity of the inter-dependence of the various countries upon each other, follows not only the political but also the economic impossibility of the building up of socialism in one country.

From this angle we will examine once again the text of the program a little closer. We have already read in the introduction that:

"Imperialism . . . intensifies the contradiction between the growth of the productive forces of world economy and national State barriers to an exceptional degree."

We have already stated that this utterance was meant to be the corner-stone of the international program. But it is precisely this enunciation which excludes, rejects and sweeps away before-

hand the theory of socialism in one country as a reactionary theory because it is irreconcilably opposed not only to the main TENDENCY of development of the productive forces but also to the MATERIAL RESULTS which have already been attained. The productive forces are incompatible with national boundaries. From here follow not only foreign trade, the export of people and capital, the conquest of land, the colonial policy, and the last imperialist war, but also the economic impossibility of a self-sufficing socialist society. The productive forces of CAPITALIST countries have already for a long time broken through the national boundaries. Socialist society however, can be built only on the most advanced productive forces, on electricity and chemistry in the processes of production including also agriculture, in the combination, generalization and culmination of the highest elements of modern technique. We have been repeating since Marx that capitalism is unable to cope with the spirit of new technique to which it has given rise and which breaks asunder not only the private property rights of bourgeois property but, as the war of 1914 has shown, also the national limits of the bourgeois State. Socialism, however, must not only take over from capitalism the most highly developed productive forces but must immediately carry them onward, raise them to a higher level and lend them such a state of development which has been unknown under capitalism. The question arises, how can socialism drive the productive forces back into the boundaries of a national state which they have broken through under capitalism? Or perhaps we ought to abandon the idea of "unbridled" productive forces for which the national boundaries AND CONSEQUENTLY ALSO THE BOUNDARIES

OF THE THEORY OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY are too narrow, and limit ourselves to, let us say, the home productive forces, that is, to our technical backwardness? If this is the case, then we should in many branches of industry stop making progress right now, and decline to a position even lower than our present pitiful technical level which managed to link up bourgeois Russia with world economy in an inseparable bond and to bring it into the vortex of the imperialist war for an EXPANSION OF ITS TERRITORY FOR THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES which had outgrown the State boundaries.

Having inherited and restored these productive forces the workers' government is COMPELLED to import and export.

The trouble is that the draft program drives mechanically into its text the thesis of the incompatibility of modern productive forces with the national boundaries, arguing as if there were no question at all of this incompatibility. Essentially the whole draft is a combination of ready-made revolutionary theses taken from Marx and Lenin and of opportunist and centrist conclusions which are absolutely incompatible with these revolutionary theses. That is why it is necessary WITHOUT BECOMING ALLURED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY FORMULA CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT to watch closely WHITHER ITS MAIN TENDENCIES LEAD.

We have already quoted that part of the first chapter which speaks of the possibility of the victory of socialism "in one capitalist country." This idea is still more roughly and sharply formulated in the 4th chapter, which says that the:

"Dictatorship (?) of the world proletariat . . . can be realized only as a result of the victory of socialism (?) in individual countries if the newly-formed pro-

letarian republics establish a federation with those which have been in existence before."

If we are to interpret the words "victory of socialism" as another name for the proletarian dictatorship then we will arrive at the general statement which is irrefutable for all and which it would be necessary to formulate less dubiously. But this is not what the authors of the draft mean. By a victory of socialism, they do not mean simply the capture of power and the nationalization of the means of production but the building up of a socialist society in one country. If we were to accept this interpretation then we would receive not a world socialist economy based on an international division of labor but a federation of self-sufficing socialist communes in the spirit of blissful anarchism with the only difference that these communes would be enlarged to the size of the present national states.

This idea is still more definitely and, if this is at all possible, more grossly expressed in the fifth chapter, where hiding behind one and a half lines of Lenin's distorted article published after his death, the authors of the draft declare that the U.S.S.R.

"possesses the necessary and sufficient MATERIAL prerequisites in the country not only for the overthrow of the nobility and the bourgeoisie but also for the COMPLETE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM."

Owing to what circumstances have we secured such extraordinary historical conditions? On this point we find a reply in the second chapter of the draft:

"The imperialist front was broken through (by the revolution of 1917) at its WEAKEST LINK, Czarist Russia."—(Our emphasis).

This is Lenin's splendid formula. Its meaning

is that Russia was the most backward and economically weakest of all imperialist states. That is precisely why her ruling classes were the first to suffer shipwreck as they had forced on the INSUFFICIENT productive forces of the country an unbearable burden. Uneven, sporadic development compelled, therefore, the proletariat of the most backward imperialist country to be the first one to take power. Formerly we were told that it is precisely because of this that the working class of the "weakest link" will have the greatest difficulties in its progress towards socialism as compared with the proletariat of the advanced countries for which it will be more difficult to take power but which, having taken power long before we have overcome our backwardness, will not only get ahead of us but will carry us along so as to bring us towards the point of real socialist construction on the basis of the highest world technique and international division of labor. This was our idea when we ventured upon the October Revolution. The Party has formulated this idea ten, nay, hundreds of thousands of times in the press and at meetings. But since 1925 they are trying to displace it by an idea which is quite the opposite to that. Now we learn that the fact that Czarist Russia was "the weakest link" gives the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., the inheritor of Czarist Russia with all its weaknesses, an invaluable advantage which is no more and no less than the possession of its own national prerequisites for for the "complete construction of socialism."

Unfortunately, Britain does not possess this advantage in view of the EXCESSIVE development of her productive forces which require almost the whole world to be able to secure the necessary raw material and to dispose of her products. If

the productive forces of Great Britain would be more "moderate" and maintain a relative equilibrium between industry and agriculture, then the British proletariat would apparently be able to build up complete socialism on its own island protected from foreign intervention by the navy.

The draft program divides in its fourth chapter the capitalist states into three groups: 1) "countries of highly developed capitalism (United States, Germany, Great Britain, etc.)"; 2) "countries of an average level of capitalist development (Russia prior to 1917, Poland, etc.)"; 3) "colonial and semi-colonial countries (China, India, etc.)."

Notwithstanding the fact that "Russia prior to 1917" was much closer to present-day China than to the United States, one could refrain from any serious objection to this schematic division were it not for the fact that it serves as a source of wrong conclusions in connection with other parts of the draft. Inasmuch as the countries "with an average level" are declared to possess "sufficient industrial minimums" for independent socialist construction, this is particularly true concerning countries of high capitalist development; it is ONLY the colonial and semi-colonial countries that need assistance. That is precisely, as we shall see later, how they are characterized in the draft program.

If, however, we approach the question of socialist construction only with this criterion, abstracting from other conditions such as the material resources of the country, the correlation between industry and agriculture within it, its place in the world economic system, then we will fall into new, no less gross, mistakes and contradictions. We have just spoken about Great Britain. Being no doubt a highly-developed capitalist country, it has, **PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THAT**, no

chance for successful socialist construction within the limits of its own island. Great Britain if blockaded would simply choke in the course of a few months.

The draft program forgets the main thesis that the present productive forces are incompatible with national boundaries, from which it follows that highly developed productive forces are by no means a lesser obstacle in the construction of socialism in one country than low productive forces, although for the reverse reason, namely, if the latter are insufficient to serve as their basis, for the former the basis will prove inadequate. The law of uneven development is forgotten precisely at the point where it is most needed and most important.

The question of the construction of socialism is not at all settled merely by the industrial "maturity" or "immaturity" of a country. This immaturity is in itself UNEVEN. In the U.S.S.R., where some branches of industry are extremely insufficient to satisfy the most elementary home requirements (particularly machine construction), other branches on the contrary cannot develop under present conditions without extensive and increasing exports. Among the latter are such branches of first importance as timber, oil, manganese, let alone agriculture. On the other hand even the "inadequate" branches cannot seriously develop if the "super-abundant" (conditionally) will be unable to export. The impossibility to build up an isolated socialist society not as a Utopia, not on the Atlantide but in the concrete geographical and historical conditions of our earthly economy is determined for various countries in different ways—by the insufficient development of some branches and the "excessive" development

of others. On the whole, this means that the modern productive forces are incompatible with national boundaries.

Endeavoring to prove the theory of socialism in one country the draft program makes a double, treble and quadruple mistake—it exaggerates the level of the productive forces in the U.S.S.R.; it closes its eyes to the law of uneven development of the various branches of industry; it ignores the international division of labor; and, finally, it forgets the most important contradiction inherent in the imperialist epoch existing between the productive forces and the national barriers.

8. THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NATIONAL REFORMISM AND REVOLUTIONARY INTERNATIONALISM.

The question can be solved only on the arena of the world revolution. The new doctrine says that socialism can be built on the basis of a national state if only there would be no intervention. From here can and must follow (notwithstanding all pompous declarations in the draft program) an opportunist policy in regard to the foreign bourgeoisie. The object is to avoid intervention, as this will guarantee the construction of socialism, which is the main historical question to be solved. The task of the parties in the Comintern becomes, therefore, of an auxiliary character, namely their mission is to protect the U.S.S.R. from intervention and not to fight for the capture of power. It is of course not a question of the subjective intentions but of the objective logic of political thought.

"The difference here lies in the fact," says Stalin, "that the Party considers that these (internal) contradictions and possible conflicts CAN BE ENTIRELY OVERCOME on the basis of the inner forces of our revolution whereas Comrade Trotsky and the Opposition think that these contradictions and conflicts can be overcome 'only on an international scale, on the arena of the world-wide proletarian revolution'."—(*Pravda*, Nov. 12, 1926).

Yes, this is precisely the difference. One could not express better and more correctly, the difference between national reformism and revolutionary internationalism. If our internal difficulties, obstacles and contradictions, which are in the main a reflection of world contradictions, can be settled merely by "the inner forces of the revolution"

without entering "the arena of the world-wide proletarian revolution" then the International is partly a subsidiary and partly a useless institution, the Congresses of which can be held once in four years, once in ten years or perhaps not at all. If we were to add that the proletariat of the other countries must protect our construction from military interventions, then the International according to this scheme, must play the role of a PACIFIST instrument. Its main role, the role of an instrument of world revolution, recedes in this connection inevitably to a backward position. And this, we repeat, is not a result of anyone's deliberate intentions, on the contrary, many points in the program show the very best intentions of its authors—but as a result of the inherent logic of the new theoretical position which is a thousand times more dangerous than the worst subjective intentions. The draft program expresses an incontrovertible idea when it says that the economic success of the U.S.S.R. constitutes an inseparable part of the world-wide proletarian revolution. But the political danger of the new theory lies in the false comparative evaluation of the two levers of international socialism—the lever of our economic achievements and the lever of the world-wide proletarian revolution. Without a victorious proletarian revolution we will not be able to build up socialism. The European workers and the workers the world over must clearly understand this. The lever of economic construction is of tremendous significance. Without proper guidance, the dictatorship of the proletariat would be weakened but its downfall would be such a blow to the international revolution from which it would take many years to recover. But the main historical difference between the socialist world and the world of

capitalism depends on the second lever, and that is the world proletarian revolution. The gigantic importance of the Soviet Union lies in the fact that it is a pillar of the world revolution and not at all because it is able to build up socialism independent of the world revolution.

The economic and political problem enters the world arena. Can the bourgeoisie secure for itself a new great epoch of capitalist growth and power? Merely to deny this, depending on the "hopeless position" which capitalism is in would be simple revolutionary nonsense. "There is no absolute hopelessness" (Lenin). The present unstable class equilibrium in the European countries cannot continue indefinitely precisely because of its instability. When Stalin and Bucharin maintain that the U.S.S.R. can get along without "State" aid of the proletariat of the other countries, that is, without its victory over the bourgeoisie, because the present active sympathy of the working masses protects us from intervention, this betrays such blindness as the entire ramification of the principal mistake in general.

It is absolutely incontrovertible that after the Social Democrats had disrupted the post-war insurrections of the European proletariat against the bourgeoisie, the active sympathy of the working masses saved the Soviet Republic. The European bourgeoisie proved, during these years, powerless in waging war against the Worker's State on a large scale. But to think that this correlation of forces will continue for many years, let us say, until the final establishment of socialism in the U.S.S.R. means to display the utmost short-sightedness and a judgment of the progress of a long period by the immediate development. Such an unstable position in which the proletariat cannot

take power but in which the bourgeoisie does not feel firm enough that it is the master of its own home, must a year sooner or later, be definitely decided in one way or another, either in favor of the proletarian dictatorship or in favor of capitalist stabilization on the backs of the masses, on the bones of the colonial peoples and . . . perhaps on our bones.

"There is no absolute hopelessness!" The European bourgeoisie can find a way out of its grave contradictions only through the defeats of the proletariat and the mistakes of the revolutionary leadership. But it would be correct to say also the reverse. A new boom of world capitalism (of course with the prospect of new epochs of great upheavals) is impossible if the proletariat will only be able to find a way out of the present unstable equilibrium on the revolutionary path.

"It is necessary to prove now by the practice of the revolutionary parties," said Lenin on July 19, 1920 at the Second Congress, "that they are sufficiently conscious and organized and that they have enough contact with the exploited masses, and determination and ability to make use of the crisis for a successful and victorious revolution."—(Lenin, Vol. 1, page 264).

Our internal contradictions, however, which depend directly on the trend of the European and world struggle, may be reasonably regulated and abated by a proper internal policy based on Marxian forecast. But they can be finally overcome only when the class contradictions will be overcome, which is out of the question without a victorious revolution in Europe. Stalin is right. The difference lies precisely here, and that is the fundamental difference between national reformism and revolutionary internationalism.

9. THE THEORY OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY AS A SOURCE OF INEVITABLE SOCIAL PATRIOTIC BLUNDERS.

The theory of socialism in one country inexorably leads to an under-estimation of the difficulties which are to be overcome and to an exaggeration of the achievements made. It is impossible to find a more anti-Socialist and anti-revolutionary statement than that made by Stalin to the effect that nine-tenths of socialism has already been realized in the U.S.S.R. That statement seems to be suitable especially for a self-contented bureaucrat. By this one can hopelessly discredit the idea of a socialist society in the eyes of the laboring masses. The successes of the laboring proletariat are enormous if we take into consideration the conditions under which they have been attained and the inherited low cultural level of the past. But these achievements constitute an extremely small magnitude on the scales of the socialist ideal. For the worker, agricultural laborer, and poor peasant who sees that in the eleventh year of the revolution, poverty, misery, unemployment, bread lines, illiteracy, homelessness, drunkenness, prostitution, have not abated, the harsh truth and not pleasant falsehoods is necessary. Instead of telling him that nine-tenths of socialism has already been realized, we must say that by our economic level, by our social and cultural conditions, we are much closer to capitalism and a backward and uncultured capitalism at that—than to socialism. We must tell them that we will enter on the path of real socialist construction only when the proletariat of the most advanced countries will capture power; that it is necessary to work over that without folding our arms, and with the two levers at that—with the

short lever of our internal economic efforts and the long lever of the international proletarian struggle.

One hears from prominent leaders of the Comintern the following arguments. The theory of socialism in one country of course, is unfounded, but it gives the Russian workers a perspective in the difficult conditions under which they labor and thus gives them courage. It is difficult to measure the depth of the theoretical fall of those who seek in the program, not a scientific basis for their class orientation, but a moral consolation. Consoling theories which do not tally with facts belong to the sphere of religion and not science, and religion is an opiate for the people.

Our Party has passed through its heroic period with a program which was entirely orientated on the international revolution and not on socialism in one country. On its programmatic banners it was written that backward Russia with her own forces will not build up socialism. The Y.C.L. has experienced the most strenuous years of civil war, hunger, cold, hard Saturday-ings and Sunday-ings, epidemics, studies on a hunger diet, numberless sacrifices, paying dearly for every step forward that has been made. The members of the Party and the Y.C.L. fought at the fronts or carried logs to the stations, not that national socialism may be built out of those logs, but because they served the cause of international revolution for which it is essential that the Soviet stronghold holds out and for the Soviet stronghold every log is important. That is how we approached the question. The conception of time has changed and shifted so that God himself does not know the extent, but the fundamental idea has remained in full force now. The proletarian, the poor peas-

ant, the partisan and the young Communists, have shown by their conduct up to 1925 when the new evangelium was for the first time proclaimed that they were not in need of it. But it is the official who looks down towards the masses, the petty administrator who does not want to be disturbed, the officer who seeks to command under cover of an all-saving and consoling formula, that need it. It is they who think that the ignorant people need the "good tidings", that the people cannot be dealt with without consoling doctrines. It is they who cling to the false words about the "nine-tenths of socialism" as this formula sanctions their privileged position, their right to command, their right to order, their need to be free from criticisms from the "incredulous", "sceptical" people.

Complaints and accusations to the effect that the denial of the possibility of building up socialism in one country dampens the spirit and kills enthusiasm are theoretically and psychologically closely related to the accusation which the reformists have always hurled along the same line against the revolutionaries, notwithstanding the different conditions under which they come. "You are telling the workers that they cannot improve substantially their conditions within the framework of capitalist society and by this alone you kill their incentive to fight." This is what the reformists used to say. In reality, under the leadership of revolutionaries, the workers really fought for economic gains and for parliamentary reforms.

The worker who clearly understands that the fate of the Soviet Republic and hence his own entirely depends on the international revolution, will fulfill his duty in relation to the U.S.S.R. much more energetically than the worker who is told that what we already possess is nine-tenths of

socialism. For "is it worth while to strive for socialism?" The reformist orientation also here as everywhere else works not only against revolution but also against reform.

* * *

In the article of 1915 dealing with the slogan of the United States of Europe, which has already been quoted we read:

"To regard the prospects of a social revolution within national boundaries means to become the victim to the same national narrowness which constitutes the substance of social patriotism. Vaillant to the very end of his days considered France the land of social revolution and it is precisely in this sense that he stood to the end for the defense of that country. Lensch and others—some hypocritically and others sincerely—consider that a defeat of Germany means first of all a destruction of the basis of social revolution. . . . In general it must not be forgotten that in social patriotism there is apart from vulgar reformism a certain tendency of national revolutionary Messiahanism which believes its own national state, whether it is by the plane of its industry or by its 'democratic' form and revolutionary conquests, is called upon to lead humanity towards socialism or towards 'democracy.' If the victorious revolution would really be conceivable within the framework of a more developed nation this Messiahanism connected with the program of national defense would have its relative historical justification. But as a matter of fact it is not conceivable. To fight for the preservation of a national basis of revolution by such methods which break up the international ties of the proletariat, actually means to undermine the basis of revolution which can begin on a national basis but which cannot be completed on that basis under the present economic and military interdependence of the European states which has never been revealed so forcefully as during the present war. This interdependence which will directly cause concerted action on the part of the European proletariat in the revolution is expressed by the slogan of a United States of Europe." (Trotsky, Volume 3, Part 1, P. 90-91.)

Proceeding from a misinterpretation of the polemics of 1915, Stalin has many times endeavored to show that by "national narrowness" Lenin was alluded to. It is hard to imagine any bigger nonsense. When I polemized with Lenin I always did so openly because I was guided only by ideological considerations. In the given case Lenin was not involved in the least. The article mentioned the people against whom these accusations were hurled by their names—Vaillant, Lensch and others. One must remember that the year of 1915 was a year of social patriotic bacchanalia and of our heated battles against it. Every question was centered on this.

The principle question raised in the quoted passage, namely, THE CONCEPTION OF THE BUILDING UP OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY AS A SOCIAL PATRIOTIC CONCEPTION was undoubtedly formulated correctly. The patriotism of the German social democrats began as a patriotism to their own party, the most powerful party of the II. International. On the basis of highly developed German technique and the high organizational abilities of the German people, the German social democrats were bent on the construction of their "own" socialist society. If we leave aside the die-hard bureaucrats, careerists, parliamentary sharpers and political crooks in general, the social patriotism of the rank and file social democrats was a result precisely of the belief in the building up of German socialism. One cannot think that the hundreds and thousands of rank and file social democrats—let alone the millions of rank and file workers—wanted to defend Hohenzollern and the bourgeoisie. No. They wanted to defend German industry, the German railways and highways, German technique and

culture, and especially the organizations of the German working class, as the "necessary and sufficient" national prerequisites.

A similar process took place also in France. Guesde, Vaillant and thousands of the best rank and file party members with them, and hundreds of thousands of rank and file workers in general, believed that precisely France with her revolutionary traditions, her heroic proletariat, her high culture, her flexible and talented people, was the promised land of socialism. Old Guesde and the Communard Vaillant, and with them the thousands and hundreds of thousands of workers did not fight for the bankers or the *rentiers*. They sincerely believed that they defended the basis and the creative power of the coming socialist society. They proceeded entirely from the theory of socialism in one country and made sacrifices to this idea believing that "temporarily" this was international solidarity.

The comparison with the social patriots will of course be answered by the argument that patriotism in relation to the Soviet State is a revolutionary duty whereas patriotism in relation to a bourgeois state is treachery. This is surely so. Can there be any dispute on this question among grown-up revolutionaries? But this incontrovertible idea becomes as we progress more and more a scholastic cover for a deliberate falsehood.

Revolutionary patriotism can be only of a class character. It begins as patriotism to the party organization, to the trade union, and rises to national patriotism when the proletariat has captured power. Wherever the workers have power patriotism is a revolutionary duty. But that patriotism must be an inseparable part of revolutionary internationalism. The invincible conviction that the main class aim even less so than partial aims can-

not be realized by national means or within national boundaries, constitutes the heart of revolutionary internationalism. If, however, the final aim has been realized within national boundaries by the efforts of a national proletariat then the backbone of internationalism has been broken. The theory of the possibility to realize socialism in one country destroys the inner connection of the patriotism of the victorious proletariat with the defeatism of the proletariat of the bourgeois countries. The proletariat of the advanced capitalist countries is still on the road to power. How and in what manner it will march towards it depends fully and entirely on the question as to whether it considers the building up of socialist society a national or an international task.

If it is at all possible to realize socialism in one country then one can believe in that theory not only AFTER the conquest of power but also "prior" to it. If socialism can be realized within the national boundaries of backward Russia, then there is the more reason to believe that it can be realized in advanced Germany. Tomorrow the leaders of the Communist Party of Germany will surely bring forward this theory. The Draft Program empowers them to do so. The day after tomorrow the French Party will have its turn. That will be the beginning of the downfall of the Comintern along the lines of social patriotism. The Communist Party of any capitalist country which will have become imbued with the idea that its particular country possesses all the "necessary and sufficient" prerequisites for the independent construction of a "complete socialist society" will in substance in no respect differ from the revolutionary social democrats who also began not with Noske but who definitely stumbled on August 4, 1914, on this very same question.

If they say that the very existence of the U.S. S. R. is a guarantee against social patriotism because in relation to a Workers' Republic patriotism is a revolutionary duty, in this one-sided utilization of a correct idea is expressed national narrow-mindedness. Those who say so have in mind only the U.S.S.R., closing their eyes to the entire proletariat of the world. To lead the proletariat to the idea of defeatism in relation to the bourgeois State is possible only by an international orientation in the program on the main question and by a merciless resistance to social patriotic contraband which is now still masked but which seeks to establish a theoretical nest for itself in the program of Lenin's International.

It is not yet too late to return to the path of Marx and Lenin. It is this return that opens up the only conceivable road to progress. To bring about this safety turn we address this criticism of the draft program to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern.

*The results and prospects of the Chinese
Revolution—Its lessons for the East-
ern countries and for the whole
of the Comintern*

Bolshevism and Menshevism and the left wing of German and international social democracy took definite shape on the analysis of the experiences, mistakes and tendencies of the 1905 revolution. An analysis of the experiences of the Chinese Revolution is now of no less importance for the international proletariat.

This analysis, however, has not yet even begun—it is prohibited. The official literature gives hurried arrangements of facts to suit the resolutions of the E.C.C.I., the baselessness of which has been thoroughly revealed. The draft program cuts down the sharpest points of the Chinese problem, but, in the main, perpetuates the destructive line of the E.C.C.I. on the Chinese question. Instead of an analysis of the greatest historical process, we find a literary defense of the bankrupt schemes.

1. ON THE NATURE OF THE COLONIAL BOURGEOISIE

The draft program says:

"Temporary agreements" (with the bourgeoisie) "may be made only insofar as they will not hamper the revolutionary organization of the workers and peasants and are genuinely fighting against imperialism."

This loose statement is based on a recognition of the ability of the colonial bourgeoisie TO WAGE A REAL struggle against imperialism and at the same time NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION of the workers and peasants. This is a defense and sanctioning of the entire policy in relation to the Kuomintang which the E.C.C.I. always interpreted as a "temporary agreement" whilst it was in reality a political enslavement of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie. To have a clear understanding of the statement quoted above we will quote an evaluation of the colonial bourgeoisie given by Bucharin, one of the authors of the draft. Basing himself on the "anti-imperialist content" of the colonial revolutions, Bucharin said:

"The liberal bourgeoisie in China has in the course of years, and not months, played an objectively revolutionary role, and then it has exhausted itself. That was not at all a 'one-day' policy of the type of the Russian liberal revolution of 1905."

Everything here is wrong from the beginning to end.

Lenin really insisted that one must strictly distinguish between an oppressed and oppressor bourgeois nation. From this arise the very important advantages, for instance, in relation to war between an imperialist and a colonial country. For a pacifist such a war is a war as any other; for a Communist

a war of a colonial nation against an imperialist nation is a bourgeois revolutionary war. Lenin thus RAISED the national liberation movement, the colonial insurrections and wars of the oppressed nations, to the level of the bourgeois democratic revolutions, particularly of the period prior to the Russian revolution of 1905. But Lenin did not at all rank the national liberation wars ABOVE bourgeois democratic revolutions as this is now done by Bucharin, who has turned an angle of 180 degrees. Lenin insisted on a distinction between a bourgeois oppressed and bourgeois oppressor country. But Lenin nowhere raised and never could raise the question from the viewpoint that the bourgeoisie of a colonial or a semi-colonial country in an epoch of struggle for national liberation must be more progressive and more revolutionary than the bourgeoisie of a non-colonial country in the epoch of the democratic revolution. Theoretically this does not follow from anything, historically this is not confirmed. No matter how pitiful, for instance, Russian liberalism appeared to be, and no matter how much of a hybrid its left half-petty-bourgeois democracy, the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks appeared to be—it is hardly possible to say that Chinese liberation and Chinese bourgeois democracy proved to be on a higher level or more revolutionary than the Russian.

To conceive that from the fact of colonial oppression there must inevitably arise a revolutionary national bourgeoisie means to imitate the main error of Menshevism which held that the Russian bourgeoisie must be revolutionary because of the autocratic feudal yoke.

The question of the nature and policy of the bourgeoisie is determined by the entire internal

class structure of a nation waging the revolutionary struggle; the historical epoch in which that struggle develops; the degree of economic, political and military dependence of the national bourgeoisie upon world imperialism in its entirety or upon one of its parts; and, finally, which is the most important, the degree of class activity of the native proletariat and the state of its connections with the international revolutionary movement.

The democratic or national liberation revolution may promise the bourgeoisie an opportunity to deepen and broaden its chance for exploitation. Independent action of the proletariat on the revolutionary arena threatens to deprive the bourgeoisie of the possibility to exploit altogether.

Let us look at some facts.

The present inspirers of the Comintern have untiringly repeated that Chiang Kai-shek waged a war "against imperialism" whilst Kerensky marched hand in hand with the imperialists and that hence it was necessary to wage an irreconcilable struggle against Kerensky, while it was necessary to support Chiang Kai-shek.

Kerensky's relations with imperialism cannot be disputed. One can go even still further back and point out that the Russian bourgeoisie "overthrew" Nicholas II with the sanction of the British and French imperialism. Not only Miliukov and Kerensky supported the war waged by Lloyd George and Poincarè, but Lloyd George and Poincarè supported Miliukov's and Kerensky's revolution against the czar, and later against the workers and peasants. Of this there can be absolutely no doubt.

But how do matters stand in this connection in China? The "February" revolution in China took place in 1911. That revolution was a great and progressive event although it was accomplished

with the direct participation of the imperialists. Sun Yat Sen, in his memoirs, relates how his organization relied in all its work on the "support" of the imperialist States—either Japan, France or America. If Kerensky in 1917 continued to take part in the imperialist war, the Chinese bourgeoisie, the "national", "revolutionary", etc. bourgeois, supported Wilson's intervention in the war with the hope that the Entente would help to emancipate China. In 1918 Sun Yat Sen addressed to the governments of the Entente his project of economic development and political emancipation of China. There is no occasion for saying that the Chinese bourgeoisie in its struggle against the Manchu Dynasty, displayed any higher revolutionary qualities than the Russian bourgeoisie in the struggle against czarism or that there is a fundamental difference between Chiang Kai-shek's and Kerensky's attitude to imperialism.

But Chiang Kai-shek, says the E.C.C.I., nevertheless fought against imperialism. To imagine this means to see facts in too brilliant a light. Chiang Kai-shek waged war against the Chinese militarists, the agents of ONE of the imperialist powers. This is not quite the same as to wage a war against imperialism. Even Tang Pin-san understood this. In his report to the Seventh Plenum of the E.C.C.I. (it was at the end of 1926) Tang Pin-san characterised the policy of the Kuomintang center headed by Chiang Kai-shek as follows:

"In the sphere of international policy it occupies a passive position in the full meaning of that word. It is inclined to fight only against British imperialism; so far as the Japanese imperialists, however, are concerned, it is under certain conditions ready to make a compromise with them." (Stenographic Report of the Seventh Plenum).

The attitude of the Kuomintang to imperialism was from the very outset not revolutionary but

opportunistic through and through. It endeavored to drive out the agents of some imperialist powers so as to compromise later with the same or other imperialist powers on more favorable terms for the Chinese bourgeoisie. That is all. One must measure not the attitude of every given national bourgeoisie to imperialism in general, but its attitude to the immediate historical tasks of the respective nation. The Russian bourgeoisie was a bourgeois of an imperialist oppressor nation; the Chinese bourgeoisie a bourgeoisie of an oppressed colonial country. The overthrow of feudal czarism was a progressive task in old Russia. The overthrow of the imperialist yoke is a progressive historical mission in China. But the attitude of the Chinese bourgeoisie in relation to imperialism, the proletariat and the peasantry, was not more revolutionary than that of the Russian, but, if you wish, even more vile and reactionary.

The Chinese bourgeoisie is sufficiently realistic and knows closely enough the nature of world imperialism to understand that a real serious struggle against it requires such an upheaval of the revolutionary masses which would first of all become a menace for the bourgeoisie itself. If the struggle against the Manchu Dynasty was a task of smaller historical importance than the overthrow of czarism, the struggle against world imperialism is a task on a much larger scale. And if we taught the workers of Russia from the very beginning not to believe in the readiness of liberalism and the ability of petty-bourgeois democracy to overthrow czarism and to destroy feudalism, we should in a no less degree, have imbued the Chinese workers with the same spirit of distrust. The new, absolutely false, theory promulgated by Stalin and Bucharin about the "imminent" revolutionary character of the colonial bourgeoisie is, in substance,

a translation of Menshevism into the language of Chinese politics, it serves only to make, on the basis of the oppressed position of China, an internal political allowance for the Chinese bourgeoisie and to throw on its scale another weight against the weights of the trebly oppressed Chinese proletariat.

But, say the authors of the draft program, Stalin and Bucharin, Chiang Kai-shek's northern campaign roused a powerful movement among the workers and peasants. Of this there is no doubt. But did not the fact that Gutchkov and Shulgin brought to Petrograd Nicolas II's abdication play a revolutionary role? Did it not arouse the most downtrodden and scared section of people? Did not the fact that Kerensky, who but yesterday was a Laborite, became the President of the Ministers' Council and the Commander-in-Chief, rouse the masses of soldiers? Did it not bring them to meetings, did it not rouse to its feet the village against the landlord? The question could be raised even more widely. Did not all workings of capitalism rouse the masses, did it not snatch them, to use the expression of the Communist Manifesto, out of the idiocy of rural life? Did it not move the proletarian battalions to the struggle? Does our historical evaluation of the role of capitalism as a whole or the various actions of the bourgeoisie stop our active class revolutionary attitude to capitalism or to the actions of the bourgeoisie? Opportunism was always based on this kind of non-dialectical conservative Khvostist "objectivism." Marxism on the contrary invariably taught that the revolutionary results of one or another act of the bourgeoisie to which it is forced by its position will be fuller, more decisive, less doubtful, and firmer, the more independent the proletarian vanguard will be in relation to the bourgeoisie, the

less it will trust the bourgeoisie, the less it will be inclined to play into the hands of the bourgeoisie, to see it in bright colors, to overestimate its revolutionary nature or its readiness for a united front or for a struggle against imperialism.

Neither theoretically nor historically nor politically can Bucharin's appraisal of the colonial bourgeoisie stand criticism. However, this is exactly the appraisal, as we have seen, the draft resolution is seeking to lay down.

* * *

One uncondemned error always leads to another or prepares the ground for it.

* * *

If yesterday the Chinese bourgeoisie was included in the one revolutionary front, today it is declared to have "definitely gone over to the counter-revolutionary camp." It is not difficult to find how unfounded are these transpositions and inclusions which have been effected in a purely administrative way, without a more or less serious Marxian analysis.

It is absolutely clear that the bourgeoisie in joining the revolution does so not accidentally, not owing to light-mindedness, but under the pressure of its class interests. For fear of the masses the bourgeoisie later deserts the revolution or openly displays its secret hatred for the revolution. But to go over "definitely" to the counter-revolutionary camp, that is, to free itself from the necessity to "support" again the revolution or at least to flirt with it, this the bourgeoisie can do only in the event that, whether in a revolutionary or in any other way (for instance the Bismarkian way), its main class requirements are satisfied. We will recall the history of the period of 1848-1871. We will recall that the Russian bourgeoisie received an opportunity to turn its back so openly to the

revolution of 1905 only because it received from the revolution the State Duma, that is, it received an opportunity to bring direct pressure to bear on the bureaucracy and to compromise with it. But when the war of 1914-1917 revealed the inability of the "new" regime to secure the basic interest of the bourgeoisie, the latter again turned towards the revolution and became more radical even than in 1905.

Can it be considered that the revolution of 1925-27 in China has at least partly satisfied the basic interests of Chinese capitalism? No. China is now just as far from national unity and from customs independence as it was prior to 1925. But as a matter of fact the creation of one home market and its protection from cheaper foreign goods is for the Chinese bourgeoisie a question of life and death. It is a question only second in importance to that of maintaining the basis of its class domination over the proletariat and the rural poor. But also for the Japanese and for the British bourgeoisie the maintenance of China in its colonial state is a question of no less importance than the question of economic independence is for the Chinese bourgeoisie. That is why the Chinese bourgeoisie will still display many zig-zag moves towards the left in its future policy. For those who like united fronts there will still be many chances in the future. To tell the Chinese Communists today that their alliance with the bourgeoisie during the period of 1924-1927 was correct but that now it is no good because the bourgeoisie has definitely gone over to the counter-revolutionary camp, means to disarm the Chinese Communists once again in face of the coming objective changes in the situation and the inevitable zig-zags of the Chinese bourgeoisie towards the left. The war now conducted by Chiang Kai-shek

fully disproves the mechanical scheme of the authors of the draft program.

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But, if you please, the fundamental error of the official formulation of the question will appear more glaringly, more convincingly, and more definitely if we will remember the fact which is still fresh in our minds, and is of no little importance, namely, that czarist Russia was a combination of oppressed and oppressor nations, that is, it consisted of Great Russians and other nationalities, many of whom lived entirely in a colonial or semi-colonial state. Lenin did not only insist on the greatest attention to the national problem of the nationalities of czarist Russia, but even proclaimed—against Bucharin and others—the elementary duty of the proletariat of the dominant nation to be the support of the struggle of the oppressed nations for their self-determination, even to the extent of separation. But did the Party conclude from this that the bourgeoisie of the nationalities oppressed by czarism—the Poles, Ukrainians, Tartars, Jews, Armenians and others—were more progressive, more revolutionary than the Russian bourgeoisie? Historical experience bears out the fact that the Polish bourgeoisie,—notwithstanding the fact that it suffered from the yoke of the autocracy and national oppression, was more reactionary than the Russian bourgeoisie and, in the State Dumas, was always inclined, not towards the Cadets (liberals) but towards the Octobrists (reactionaries). The same is true concerning the Tartar bourgeoisie. The fact that the Jews had absolutely no rights whatever did not prevent the Jewish bourgeoisie from being more cowardly, more reactionary, and more vile than the Russian bourgeoisie. Or perhaps the Esthonian bourgeoisie, the Lettish, the Georgian, or the Armenian bour-

geoisie were more revolutionary than the Great Russian bourgeoisie? How can one forget such historical lessons?

Or perhaps now, *post factum*, we should declare that Bolshevism was wrong when—in contradistinction to the Bund, the Dashnjaks, the P.P.S., the Georgian and other Mensheviks—it called upon the workers of **ALL** oppressed nationalities, of all colonial peoples of czarist Russia, at the very dawn of the bourgeois democratic revolution, to dissociate themselves from the other classes and form their independent class organizations, to break ruthlessly all organizational ties not only with the liberal bourgeoisie, but also with the revolutionary petty-bourgeois parties, to win over the working class in the struggle against those parties, and to fight against them with the help of the workers, for influence over the peasantry? Was it not a “Trotskyist” mistake, did we not skip over, in relation to the oppressed, including the extremely backward nations, the Kuomintang phase of development? How easy it is after all to say that the P.P.S., the Dashnjaks, the Tsutun, the Bund and others were “peculiar” forms of necessary collaboration of the various classes in the struggle against the autocracy and against national oppression. Can such historical lessons be forgotten?

For a Marxian it was clear even prior to the Chinese events of the last three years—now it should become clear even to the blind—that foreign imperialism as a direct factor in the internal life of China, renders the Chinese Miliukovs and Chinese Kerenskys in the final analysis even more vile than their Russian prototypes. It is not in vain that the very first manifesto of our Party proclaimed that the further east we go the lower and more vile become the bourgeoisie, the great-

er become the tasks of the proletariat. This historical law fully applies also to China.

“Our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, THEREFORE the workers must support the bourgeoisie—this is what the bankrupt politicians of the liquidator camp say. Our revolution is a bourgeois revolution is what we Marxians say. THEREFORE the workers must open the eyes of the people to the treachery of the bourgeois politicians, teach them not to believe them and to rely on their OWN forces, on their OWN organizations, on their OWN unification, and on their OWN arms alone.” (Lenin. Vol. 14, part 1, Page 11).

This Lenin thesis is obligatory for the whole of the East and must by all means find a place in the program of the Comintern.

2. STAGES OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION.

The first stage of the Kuomintang was the period of domination of the national bourgeoisie under the apologetic banner of an "Alliance of Four Classes". The second period, after the Chiang Kai-shek *coup d'Etat* was an experiment of parallel and "independent" domination of the Chinese Kerensky. While the Russian Populists, together with the Mensheviks, lent to their short-lived "dictatorship" the form of an open dual power, the Chinese "revolutionary democracy" did not reach that stage. And inasmuch as history in general does not work to order, there is nothing left for us but to understand that there is not and that there will not be any other "democratic dictatorship" except the Kuomintang dictatorship of 1925. This remains equally true regardless of the fact as to whether the semi-unification of China accomplished by the Kuomintang will be maintained in the coming period or whether the country will again be broken to pieces. But precisely when the class dialectics of the revolution, having spent all its resources, put on the order of the day the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the numberless millions of oppressed and down-trodden of town and country on its side, the E.C. C.I. advanced the slogan of a democratic dictatorship (that is, bourgeois democracy) of the workers and peasants. The reply to this was the Canton insurrection which, with all its prematurity, with all the adventurism of its leaders, lifted the curtain over a new stage, or, more correctly, over the coming THIRD Chinese revolution.

Trying to insure themselves against the sins of the past, the leaders terrifically forced the trend of events at the end of last year and brought about

the Canton miscarriage. However, even a miscarriage can teach us a good deal concerning the organism of the mother and the process of birth. The tremendous theoretical and even decisive significance of the Canton events for the fundamental problems of the Chinese Revolution is precisely due to the fact that we have received here, which happens so rarely in history and politics, an EXPERIMENT ON A GIGANTIC SCALE, ALMOST AS MADE IN A LABORATORY. We paid for it dearly, but that makes it the more imperative for us to digest the lessons.

One of the fighting slogans of the Canton insurrection, as *Pravda* No. 31 relates, was the watchword "Down with the Kuomintang". The Kuomintang banners and signs were torn and trampled upon. But it was already after the "betrayal" of Chiang Kai-shek and after the "betrayal" of Wang Chin-wei that the E.C.C.I. pompously declared: "We will not give up the Kuomintang banners." The workers of Canton forbade the Kuomintang Party, DECLARING ALL OF ITS TENDENCIES ILLEGAL. This means that to solve the basic national tasks, not only the big bourgeoisie but also the small bourgeoisie failed to advance a political power, a Party, a fraction, in conjunction with which the proletarian party might be able to solve the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution. The key to the position lies in the fact that the task of leading the movement of the poor peasants fell already entirely on the shoulders of the proletariat and the Communist Party directly and the approach to a real solution of the revolutionary tasks necessitated the concentration of all forces in the hands of the proletariat.

As to the short-lived Canton Soviet Government, the *Pravda* reports:

"In the interests of the workers, the decrees of the Canton Soviet proclaimed. . . workers' control of industry through the factory committees, the nationalization of big industry, transport and the banks."

Then, measures are mentioned such as the "confiscation of all dwellings of the big bourgeoisie for the benefit of the laborers. . ."

Thus the Canton workers were in power and the government was actually in the hands of the Communist Party. The program of the new government was not only to confiscate the feudal lands inasmuch as such exist in Kwantung in general; not only to establish workers' control of industry; but also to nationalize big industry, the banks and transport, and to confiscate the bourgeois dwellings and all property for the benefit of the laborers. The question arose, if such are the methods of a bourgeois revolution what should the proletarian revolution in China look like? Notwithstanding the fact that the instructions of the E. C. C. I. said nothing about the proletarian dictatorship and Socialist measures, notwithstanding the fact that Canton when compared with Shanghai, Hankow and other industrial centers of the country, has more of a petty-bourgeois character, the revolutionary upheaval effected against the Kuomintang led automatically to the proletarian dictatorship which, at its very first steps, found itself compelled by the entire situation to take more radical measures than those with which the October Revolution began. And this fact, notwithstanding its external paradoxical character is quite a normal outcome of the social relations of China as well as of the whole development of the revolution.

Large and middle scale land ownership is most closely intertwined with urban, including foreign capital. There is no land owning caste in China

in opposition to the bourgeoisie. The most widespread, generally-hated exploiter in the village is the wealthy peasant, the usurer, the agent of urban bank capital. The agrarian revolution has therefore just as much of an anti-feudal as it has of an anti-bourgeois character in China. The first stage of our October revolution in which the wealthy peasant marched hand in hand with the middle and poor peasant and frequently in the lead against the landlord will not, or as much as will not, take place in China. The agrarian revolution there will be from the very beginning, and also later on, an uprising not only against the few landlords and bureaucrats, but also against the wealthy peasants and usurers. If in Russia the poor peasant committees acted only in the second stage of the October revolution, in the middle of 1918, in China they will, in one form or another, appear on the scene as soon as the agrarian movement will revive. The breaking up of the rich peasants will be the first and not the second stage in the Chinese October.

The agrarian revolution, however, is not the only meaning of the present historical struggle in China. The most extreme agrarian revolution, the general division of land, will naturally be supported by the Communist Party to the very end. But in itself this will not be a way out of the economic blind alley. It is now essential for China to have national unity and economic independence, that is, customs autonomy, or more correctly, a monopoly of foreign trade. And this means the EMANCIPATION FROM WORLD IMPERIALISM, for which China remains in perspective the MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF WEALTH, a means of livelihood and as a safety valve against internal explosions of capitalism in Europe today

and America tomorrow. This is what determines the gigantic scope and monstrous sharpness of the struggle which faces the masses of China, the more so now when the depth of the stream of the struggle has already been measured and felt by all of its participants.

The enormous role of foreign capitalism in Chinese industry and its custom to rely directly on its own "national" bayonets, makes the program of workers' control in China even less real than it was in Russia. The direct expropriation of the foreign capitalist and later also the Chinese capitalist enterprises, will most likely be made imperative by the struggle, on the morrow after the victorious insurrection.

This objective socio-historical causes of the "October" outcome of the Russian revolution rise before us in China in a still more accentuated form. The bourgeois and proletarian sections of the Chinese people stand up against each other even more distinctly, if this is at all possible, than they did in Russia inasmuch as, on the one hand, the Chinese bourgeoisie is directly connected with foreign imperialism and its military machine and, on the other hand, the Chinese proletariat has from the very beginning established relations with the Comintern and the Soviet Union. Numerically the Chinese peasantry constitutes an even more overwhelming mass than the Russian peasants. But being crushed in the fight between world contradictions, upon the solution of which in one way or another its fate depends, the Chinese peasantry, is even less capable than the Russian of playing a DOMINANT role. It is no longer a theoretical forecast but a fact tested through and through and from all sides.

These main, and, at the same time, incontro-

vertible social and political prerequisites of the third Chinese revolution show not only that the formula of a democratic dictatorship has hopelessly outlived its usefulness, but also that the third Chinese revolution, in spite of the extreme backwardness of China or more correctly, because of this great backwardness, as compared with Russia, will not have even its half-year "democratic" period such as the October revolution had (November 1917 to July 1918), but will be compelled from the very beginning, to effect the most decisive shake-up and abolition of bourgeois property in town and country.

True, this perspective does not harmonize with the pedantic and schematic conceptions concerning the inter-relations between economics and politics. But the responsibility for this disharmony which disturbs the newly adopted prejudice must not be blamed on "Trotskyism" but on the law of UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT. In the given case it is exactly in place.

It would be unwise pedantry to maintain that the Chinese Communist Party, had it pursued a Bolshevik policy in the revolution of 1925-1927 would surely have come to power. But it is pitiful Philistinism to maintain that this possibility was entirely out of the question. The mass movement of workers and peasants was absolutely sufficient for it, as was also the collapse of the ruling classes. The national bourgeoisie sent its Chiang Kai-sheks and Wang Chin-weis to Moscow, and through its Hu Han-mins was knocking at the door of the Comintern; precisely because it was hopelessly weak in face of the revolutionary masses, it realised its weakness and sought to insure itself somehow. Neither the workers nor the peasants would have followed the national bourgeoisie if we ourselves

had not urged them to do so. Had the Comintern pursued a more or less correct policy, the outcome of the struggle of the Communist Party for the masses was pre-determined—the Chinese proletariat would have supported the Communists, while the peasants would have supported the revolutionary proletariat.

If, at the beginning of the northern campaign we had begun to organize Soviets in the “liberated” districts (and the masses were instinctively fighting for that) we would have secured the necessary basis and revolutionary sentiment, we would have rallied to our side the agrarian uprisings, we would have built OUR OWN army, we would have undermined the opposing armies and—notwithstanding the youthfulness of the Communist Party of China—it would have been able with proper Comintern guidance, to mature in these stressful years and come to power, if not in the whole of China at once, then at least in a considerable part of China. And chiefly, we would have had a party.

But precisely in the sphere of leadership something absolutely monstrous has occurred—a direct historical catastrophe. The authority of the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik Party and the Comintern came to the support at first of Chiang Kai-shek against an independent policy of the Communist Party and then to the support of Wang Chin-wei as the leader of the agrarian revolution. Having trampled upon the very basis of Lenin’s policy and paralysed the young Communist Party of China, the E.C.C.I. led to a victory of the Chinese Kerenskys over Bolshevism, the Chinese Miliukovs over the Kerenskys and of Japanese and British imperialism over the Chinese Miliukovs.

In this and only in this lies the meaning of what has happened in China in the course of 1925-1927.

3. DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP OR A DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETAR- IAT?

What was the decision of the last Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on the experiences of China, including the experiences of the Canton insurrection? What further prospects has it outlined? The resolution of the February (1928) Plenum, being the key to the corresponding parts of the draft program, says concerning the Chinese Revolution:

"It is wrong to characterize it as a 'permanent revolution'" (the position of the representative of the E. C. C. I.). "The tendency of skipping (?) through the bourgeois democratic phase of the revolution with a simultaneous (?) appraisal of the revolution as a 'permanent revolution' is a mistake similar to that which Trotsky made in 1905 (?)".

The ideological life of the Comintern since Lenin's departure from its leadership that is, since 1923, consisted primarily in a struggle against so-called "Trotskyism" and particularly against "permanent revolution". How could it happen that in the main question of the Chinese revolution not only the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, but even the official representative of the Comintern, that is, the leader who was especially instructed for the job, should have fallen into the same "error" for which hundreds of people are now being exiled in Siberia and put in prison? The struggle around the Chinese problem has been raging already about two and a half years. When the Opposition declared that the old Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Chen Du-siu) under the influence of wrong instructions from the Comintern, conducted an opportunist policy, this was declared to be "slander".

The leadership of the Communist Party of China

was declared flawless. The well-known Tang Pinsan clamored with the general approval of the Seventh Plenum of the E.C.C.I. that:

"As soon as the first manifestations of Trotskyism made their appearance the Communist Party of China and the Young Communist League immediately adopted a unanimous resolution against Trotskyism." (Stenographic Report. Page 205).

When however, notwithstanding these "achievements" events have unfolded their tragical logic which at first led to the first and then to the second, even more terrific, ruin of the revolution, the leaders of the Communist Party of China were rechristened in twenty-four hours from being model leaders to Mensheviks. At the same time it was declared that the new leaders fully represented the line of the Comintern. But as soon as another serious phase came it was found that the new Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is guilty, as we have already seen, not in words, but in action, of having adopted the position of the so-called "permanent revolution". This is the path chosen also by the representative of the Comintern. This surprising and unbelievable fact can be explained only by the glaring "scissors" between the instructions of the E.C.C.I. and the real dynamics of the revolution.

We will not dwell here upon the myth of the "permanent revolution" of 1905 which was cast out in 1924, in order to sow confusion. We will limit ourselves to an analysis of how this myth broke down on the question of the Chinese revolution.

The first paragraph of the February resolution, from which we have taken the above passage, motivizes its negative attitude to the so-called "permanent revolution" as follows:

"The present period of the Chinese Revolution

is a period of democratic revolution which has not been completed either from the economic viewpoint (the agrarian revolution and the abolition of the feudal relations) or from the viewpoint of the national struggle against imperialism (the unification of China and the establishment of national independence), or from the viewpoint of the class nature of the government (the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry)."

This motivization is full of blunders and contradictions.

The E.C.C.I. taught that the Chinese revolution must guarantee an opportunity for China to develop along socialist lines. This could be done only if the revolution would not stop at the solution merely of the bourgeois democratic task but by growing over from one stage into another, that is, by constantly or permanently developing, would lead China towards socialist development. This is precisely what Marx understood by the term "permanent revolution". How then can one, on the one hand, speak of a non-capitalist path of development of China and on the other deny the permanent character of the revolution?

But—objects the resolution of the E.C.C.I.—the revolution has not been completed, either from the viewpoint of the agrarian revolution or from the viewpoint of the national struggle against imperialism. Hence the conclusion about the bourgeois democratic nature of the "present period of the Chinese revolution". In reality the "present period" is a period of counter-revolution. The E. C.C.I. apparently wants to say that the new rise of the Chinese revolution, or more correctly, **THE THIRD CHINESE REVOLUTION**, will be of a bourgeois democratic character, in view of the fact that the second Chinese revolution of 1925-1927 has not solved the agrarian problem nor the national problem. However, even with this correc-

tion, this argumentation is built on a complete failure to understand the experiences and lessons both of the Chinese as well as of the Russian revolution.

The February revolution of 1917 in Russia left unsolved all internal and international problems which led to the revolution—serfdom in the villages, the bureaucracy, the war and the economic ruin. Based on this, not only the S. R.s and the Mensheviks, but also a considerable section of the leaders of our own Party tried to show Lenin that the “present period of the revolution is a period of the bourgeois democratic revolution.” In its general aspect the resolution of the E.C.C.I. merely copies the objections raised against the struggle for the proletarian dictatorship waged by the opportunists against Lenin in 1917. Furthermore, the bourgeois democratic revolution proves to be unaccomplished not only from the economic and national viewpoint, but also from the “viewpoint” of the class nature of the government (the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry). This can only mean that it has been forbidden that the Chinese proletariat fight for power so long as there is no real democratic government in China. Unfortunately it is not pointed out where that is to come from.

The confusion is further increased by the fact that the Soviet slogan was rejected for China in the course of two years on the sole ground that Soviets can be organized only during the transition towards the proletarian revolution (Stalin’s “theory”). But when the Soviet Revolution broke out in Canton and its participants arrived at the conclusion that this is the transition to the proletarian revolution, they were accused of “Trotskyism”. Can a Party be trained in such a way and

can it be helped in this manner to solve the greatest tasks?

To save a hopeless position the resolution of the E.C.C.I. without any contact with the entire trend of its thought, gives its last argument—from imperialism. We find that the tendency to skip through the bourgeois democratic phase:

“is the more harmful because such a formulation of the question excludes (?) the greatest national peculiarity of the Chinese revolution being a semi-colonial revolution.”

The only meaning that these words have is that the imperialist yoke will be overthrown by some other and not the proletarian dictatorship. But this means that the “greatest national peculiarity” has been dragged in at the last moment only in order to present in bright colors the Chinese national bourgeoisie or Chinese “petty-bourgeois democracy.” They can have no other meaning. But this only “meaning” we have sufficiently examined in our chapter concerning the “nature of the colonial bourgeoisie” and there is no need to return to this subject.

China is still confronted with an enormous, terrific, bloody and prolonged struggle for such elementary objects as the liquidation of the most “Asiatic” forms of slavery, such as national emancipation and unification of the country. But it is from here, as the march of events has shown that further petty-bourgeois leadership or even half leadership in the revolution is impossible. The unification of China is now an international task. It is no less international than the existence of the U. S. S. R. This task can be solved only by means of a desperate struggle of the suppressed, hungry and downtrodden masses under the direct leadership of the proletarian vanguard, not only against world

imperialism, but also against its economic and political agency in China — the bourgeoisie, including also the “national” and democratic bourgeois flunkys. And that is the road leading towards the proletarian dictatorship.

Beginning with April 1917 Lenin explained to his opponents who accused him of having adopted the position of the “permanent revolution”, that the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry was partly realized in the epoch of dual government. He explained later that it was further realized during the first period of Soviet power since November 1917 until July 1918, when the peasants, together with the workers, effected the agrarian revolution while the working class had not yet proceeded with the confiscation of the factories and plants, but experimented on workers’ control. As to the “class nature of the government”, the democratic S. R.-Menshevik “dictatorship” gave all that it could give—the dual government miscarriage. As to the agrarian revolution, it gave birth to a healthy and strong child, only the proletarian dictatorship acted as the midwife. In other words, that which in the theoretical formula of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry was united, was disunited in the course of the actual class struggle.

The empty shell of the half government was provisionally entrusted to Kerensky and Tseretelli; the real kernel of the agrarian democratic revolution was in the hands of the victorious working class. This dialectical disappointment of the democratic dictatorship, the leaders of the E.C.C.I. failed to understand. They have landed in a political blind alley mechanically condemning any “skipping through the bourgeois democratic phase” and endeavoring to guide the historical process by

means of circular letters. If we are to understand by the bourgeois democratic phase, the completion of the agrarian revolution by means of a "democratic dictatorship" then no other but the October Revolution rashly "skipped" through the bourgeois democratic phase. Should it not be condemned for having done so? Why is it that that which was historically inevitable was the highest expression of Bolshevism in Russia, whereas it proved to be "Trotskyism" in China? Apparently owing to the same logic on the basis of which the theory of the Martinovs, who for over twenty years have fought Bolshevism in Russia, was declared suitable for China. But can such a comparison at all be made with Russia? The slogan of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry—we object—was built up by the leaders of the E.C.C.I. exclusively and entirely by the method of analogy, but a formal and literal analogy and not a material and historical analogy. An analogy between China and Russia is absolutely admissible if we find the proper key to it, and this analogy was excellently made use of by Lenin and not **post factum** but beforehand, as if he had foreseen the future blunders. Lenin had to defend the October revolution, that is the conquest of power by the proletariat, hundreds of times, **NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT** that the bourgeois democratic tasks had not been fulfilled. Precisely **BECAUSE OF THAT, PRECISELY FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF THAT**, replied Lenin, in answer to the pedants who in their arguments against the capture of power referred to the economic immaturity of Russia for socialism which was "unquestionable" for Lenin. (Vol. 18. Part 2. Page 119). In reply to this pedantry Lenin said on January 16th 1923:

"It does not even occur to them for instance that Russia, standing on the border of civilized countries, and countries which were for the first time by this war definitely drawn into the vortex of civilization (all Eastern countries, the non-European countries) therefore could and should have manifested some originality along the general lines of world development by distinguishing its revolution from all preceding revolutions of the Western countries and introducing certain new elements in approaching the Eastern countries." (Ibid., page 118).

The "originality" which brings Russia CLOSER to the Eastern countries was seen by Lenin in the fact that the young proletariat had at an early stage to take hold of the broom so as to clear the road from feudal barbarism and every other kind of rubbish for socialism.

If, consequently, we are to proceed on the basis of Lenin's comparison between China and Russia, we must say—from the viewpoint of the "POLITICAL NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT", all that could have been obtained through the democratic dictatorship has in China been tried out first in Sun Yat Sen's Canton, then on the road from Canton to Shanghai which was crowned by Shanghai *coup d'Etat*, then in Wuchang where the Left Kuomintang appeared in its chemically pure aspect, i. e., according to the instructions of the E.C.C.I., as an organizer of the agrarian revolution, but in reality as its hangman. The social content of the bourgeois democratic revolution will have to be completed by the first period of the coming dictatorship of the Chinese proletariat and the rural poor. To advance now the slogan of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry when the role not only of the Chinese bourgeoisie, but also of democracy has already been tested through and through, when it has become absolutely certain that "democracy" will in the coming

struggle play even a more despicable role than in the past, simply means to create the means of covering up the new forms of Kuomintangism and to put up a trap for the proletariat.

Of course it is not by any means a question of calling the Communist Party of China immediately to revolt to capture power. The tempo depends entirely upon the circumstances.

The revolution is now subsiding. The half-concealing resolutions of the E.C.C.I., and the tales about imminent revolutionary onslaughts, while numberless people are being executed and a terrific commercial and industrial crisis rages in the country is criminal light-mindedness and no more. After three overwhelming defeats an economic crisis does not rouse, but on the contrary, depresses the proletariat which, as it is, has already been bled white, and the executions only destroy the politically weakened party, the formation and strengthening of firm organizational links in all spheres of the labor movement. The organization of rural nuclei, leadership and unification of partial, at first defensive and later offensive, battles of the workers and the rural poor is now necessary.

How will a new mass movement begin? What circumstances will give the proletarian vanguard at the head of the multitudinous millions the necessary revolutionary impulse? This cannot be foretold. Whether simple internal processes alone will be sufficient or whether an impulse will have to be given from without, the future will show.

It is not difficult to understand that the first stage of the coming third revolution can in a different and greatly abridged form repeat the stages which have already been passed, for instance, an imitation of the "common national front". But will that first stage be sufficient to give the Com-

munist Party a chance to put forward and announce its "April" theses, that is, its program and tactics of the capture of power before the masses?

What does the draft program say on this?

"The transition to the proletarian dictatorship is possible here (in China) only after a series of preparatory stages(?) only as a result of a whole period of growing over(?) of the bourgeois democratic revolution into the socialist revolution."

In other words all the "stages" that have already been gone through are not taken into account. What has been left behind, the draft program still sees ahead. This is exactly what is meant by dragging behind the tail. It fully opens the gates for new experiments in the spirit of Kuo-mintang rehearsal. Thus the concealment of the old solecisms inevitably prepares the road for new errors.

If we enter the new uprisings, which will develop at an incomparably more rapid rate than the last one, with a plan of "democratic dictatorship" that has already outlived its usefulness, there can be no doubt that the third revolution will be lost just as the second one.

4. ADVENTURISM AS A PRODUCT OF OPPORTUNISM.

The second paragraph of the same resolution of the February plenum of the E.C.C.I. says:

"The first wave, the broad revolutionary movement of workers and peasants which in the main proceeded under the slogans, and to a considerable extent UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, is over. It ended in several centers of the revolutionary movement with HEAVY DEFEATS for the workers and peasants, the physical extermination of the Communists and revolutionary cadres of the labor and peasant movement in general." (Our emphasis).

When the "wave" was surging high the E.C.C.I. said that the movement is entirely under the banner and leadership of the Kuomintang which even takes the place of Soviets. It is precisely on that ground that the Communist Party was subordinated to the Kuomintang. But that is exactly why the revolutionary movement ended with "heavy defeats." Now when these defeats have been recognized, an attempt is being made to delete the Kuomintang from the past as if it had not existed, as if the E.C.C.I. had not declared the blue banner its own.

There have been no defeats either in Shanghai or in Wuchang in the past; there were merely transitions of the revolution "into higher phases"—that is what we have been taught. Now the sum total of these transitions is suddenly declared to be "heavy defeats for the workers and peasants". However, in order to mask to some extent this unprecedented political bankruptcy of transitions and evaluations, the concluding paragraph of the resolution says:

"The E. C. C. I. makes it the duty of all sections of the E. C. C. I. to fight against the social democratic and Trotskyist slanders to the effect that the Chinese revolution has been liquidated (?)".

In the first paragraph of the resolution we were told that Trotskyism was the idea of PERMANENT revolution, that is, a revolution which is now growing over from its bourgeois to the socialist phase; from the last paragraph we learn that according to the "Trotskyists", "the Chinese revolution has been liquidated." How can a "liquidated" revolution be a PERMANENT revolution?

Only complete and reckless irresponsibility permits of such contradictions which eat up all revolutionary thought at its roots.

If we are to understand by "liquidation" of the revolution the fact that the labor and peasant offensive has been set back and drowned in blood, that the masses are in a state of retreat, that before another onslaught there must be, apart from many other things, a molecular process at work among the masses which requires a certain period of time the length of which cannot be determined beforehand; if "liquidation" is to be understood in this way, it does not in any way differ from the "heavy defeats" which the E.C.C.I. has at last been compelled to recognize. Or are we to understand liquidation literally, i. e., actual elimination of the Chinese revolution, that is, the very possibility and inevitability of its revival on a new plane? One can speak of such a perspective seriously only in two cases—if China would be doomed to dismemberment and complete ruin, for which there is not the slightest reason to think, or if the Chinese bourgeoisie would prove capable to solve the basic problems of Chinese life in its own non-revolutionary way. Is it not this last variant that the

theoreticians of the "Alliance of Four Classes", who forced the Communist Party under the heel of the bourgeoisie, ascribe to us now?

The strength of Marxism lies in its ability to foretell. In this instance the Opposition can point to an absolute confirmation of their prognosis by history. At first concerning the Kuomintang as a whole, then concerning the left Kuomintang and the Wuchang Government, and finally, concerning the "deposit" on the third revolution, that is the Canton insurrection. What other confirmation can there be of one's theoretical correctness?

The very same opportunist line which by the policy of capitulation to the bourgeoisie, has already brought the revolution at its first two phases, the "heaviest defeat" "grew over" in the third phase, into a policy of adventurous attacks on the bourgeoisie, and made the defeat final.

If the leadership had hurried yesterday to leap across the defeats which it had brought about it would first of all have explained to the Communist Party of China that victory is not gained in one sweep, that on the road to an armed insurrection there is still a period of intense, untiring, and unparalleled struggle for political influence on the workers and peasants ahead.

On September 17, 1927 we said to the presidium of the E.C.C.I.:

"Today's papers report that the revolutionary army has taken Swatow. The armies of Ho Lun and Ye Tin have been marching already a few weeks. *Pravda* calls these armies revolutionary armies. But the question is what prospects does the movement of the revolutionary army which captured Swatow raise before the Chinese revolution? What are the slogans of the movement? What is its program? What should be its organizational forms? What has become of the slogan of Soviets, which *Pravda* suddenly advanced for a July?"

Without first organizing the Communist Party against the Kuomintang, in its entirety, without agitation among the masses for Soviets and a Soviet Government, without an independent mobilization of the masses under the slogan of agrarian revolution and national emancipation, without the creation, broadening and strengthening of the Soviets of workers, soldiers, and peasants deputies in the localities, the rising of Ho Lun and Ye Tin, let alone their opportunist policy, could not fail to be an isolated adventure, a pseudo-Communist Makhno feat, which could not but clash against its own isolation, and it has clashed.

The Canton insurrection was a broader and deeper rehearsal of Ho Lun's and Ye Tin's adventure, only with immeasurably greater tragic consequences.

The February resolution of the E.C.C.I. combats certain putschist tendencies in the Communist Party of China, that is, tendencies in favor of sporadic action. It does not say, however, that these tendencies are a reaction to the entire opportunist policy of 1925-27, and an unavoidable consequence of the purely military commanding given from above to "change the step" without appraising all that had been done, without an open revaluation of the basis of the tactics, without a clear perspective. Ho Lun's march and the Canton insurrection were and had to be outbursts of sporadic action. A real antidote to putschism as well as opportunism can be a clear understanding of the truth that from now on it behoves the Communist Party of China to guide the armed insurrections of the workers and poor peasants, the capture of power and the institution of a revolutionary dictatorship. If it will thoroughly assimilate the understanding of this, it will be little inclined

to improvize military attacks on towns or armed insurrections in traps or to chase humbly after the enemy's banner.

The resolution of the E.C.C.I. condemns itself to impotence by the fact alone that in arguing most abstractly concerning the inadmissability of skipping through stages and the harmfulness of putschism, it entirely ignores THE CLASS CONTENT of the Canton insurrection and the short-lived Soviet regime which it brought into existence. We Oppositionists hold that this insurrection was an adventure of the leaders in an effort to save "their prestige", but it is clear to us that also an adventure develops according to certain definite laws which are determined by the structure of the social environments. That is why we seek in the Canton insurrection the features of the coming phase of the Chinese revolution. These features fully correspond with our theoretical analysis of the Canton uprising. But how much more imperative is it for the E.C.C.I. which holds that the Canton rising was a correct and proper link in the chain of struggle to give a clear class characterization of the Canton insurrection. However, there is not a word about this in the resolution of the E.C.C.I. although the Plenum met immediately after the Canton events. Is this not the most convincing proof that the present leadership of the Comintern, because it pursues a false policy, is compelled to play on alleged errors of 1905 and other years without daring to approach the Canton insurrection of 1927, the meaning of which fully upsets the scheme of revolutions in the East which is outlined in the draft program?

5. SOVIETS AND REVOLUTION.

In the February resolution of the E.C.C.I. the representative of the Comintern, Comrade N., "and others", are made responsible for the "absence of an ELECTED Soviet in Canton as an organ of insurrection". (Emphasis in the original). This charge is in our opinion a surprising admission.

In the report of *Pravda* written on the basis of first hand documents (No. 31) it was stated that there was a Soviet government established in Canton. But it said nothing about the fact that the Canton Soviet was NOT an elected organ, that is, that it was not a SOVIET—for how can there be a Soviet which has not been elected? We learn this from the resolution. Let us reflect for a moment. The E.C.C.I. tells us now that a Soviet is necessary in an armed insurrection, but by no means before that. But when the date for the insurrection is set there is no Soviet. To set up an elected Soviet is not at all an easy matter. It is necessary that the masses should know from experience what a Soviet is, that they understand its form, that they should have learned something in the past about the election of Soviets. Of this there was no sign in China as the slogan of Soviets was declared to be a Trotskyist slogan precisely in the period when it should have become the nerve center of the entire movement. When, however, later, a date was fixed for an insurrection so as to skip over their own defeats, they simultaneously had to APPOINT a Soviet. If we were not to expose this error to the very end, the slogan of Soviets might be turned into a strangling noose of the revolution.

Lenin explained to the Mensheviks in his time

that the main task hitherto of the Soviets is to organize or to help to organize the capture of power so that on the morrow after the victory it may become the machinery of that power. The epigones—not disciples, but epigones—draw from this the conclusion that Soviets may be organized only when the 12th hour has struck. On the basis of Lenin's broad generalization they wrote **post factum** a short prescription which does not serve the interests of the revolution but to its detriment.

Before the Bolshevik Soviets in October 1917 captured power the S. R. and Menshevik Soviets had existed for nine months. Twelve years prior to that the first revolutionary Soviets existed in Petersburg and Moscow and many other towns. Before the Soviet of 1905 embraced the factories and plants of the capital there was a printers' Soviet in Moscow during the printers' strike, and a few months prior to that, in May 1905, a mass strike in Ivanovo-Voznesensk set up a leading committee which already contained all the principal features of a Soviet of deputies. Between the first experiment of setting up a Soviet of deputies and the gigantic experiment of setting up a Soviet Government, more than 12 years rolled by. Of course, such a period is not absolutely essential for all countries, including China. But to think that the Chinese workers are capable of organizing Soviets on the basis of a short prescription which substitutes Lenin's broad generalization means the substitution of an impotent and importunate pedantry for dialectic revolutionary action. Soviets must be set up not on the eve of uprisings, not under the watchword of immediate capture of power—for if the matter has reached the point of the capture of power, if the masses are prepared for an armed insurrection **WITHOUT A SOVIET** it means

that there have been other organizational forms and methods which made possible the performance of the preparatory work to ensure the success of the uprising, the question of Soviets becomes of secondary importance and reduces itself to a question of organizational technique or still less to a question of name. The task of the Soviets is not merely to issue the call for the insurrection or to carry that insurrection out, but TO LEAD THE MASSES TOWARD THE INSURRECTION THROUGH THE NECESSARY PHASES. At first the Soviet rallies the masses not to the slogan of an armed insurrection, but to partial slogans, so that only later, step by step, they are brought towards the insurrection without scattering them on the road and without allowing the vanguard to become isolated from the class. The Soviet appears mostly and primarily in connection with strikes which have the perspectives of revolutionary development, but are in the given moment limited merely to economic demands. The masses must feel and understand while in action that the Soviet is THEIR organization, that it marshalls the forces for a struggle for resistance, for self-defense and for an offensive. They can feel and understand this not on a one day experiment and in general not through one act, but on the experience of several weeks, months and perhaps years, with intermissions or without. Therefore, only an epigonian bureaucratic leadership can restrain the rising and mutinous masses from the creation of Soviets in conditions when the country is passing through big and revolutionary upheavals and when the working class and the poor peasants have before them the prospect of capturing power, even if only in one of the later phases and even if that prospect can be appre-

ciated in the given phase only by a small minority. That was always our conception of the Soviets. We valued the Soviet as that broad and flexible organizational form which is understood by the masses who have just awakened in their very first phase of revolutionary action and which is capable of uniting the working class in its entirety, regardless as to how large a section of it has in the given phase already grown to the point of understanding the tasks of capturing power.

Is any further documentary evidence necessary? Here, for instance, is what Lenin wrote about the Soviets in the epoch of the first revolution:

"The R. S. D. L. P."—that was then the name of the party—"has never refused to utilize at MOMENTS OF GREATER OR SMALLER REVOLUTIONARY UNREST certain non-party organizations such as Soviets of workers' deputies for the strengthening of the influence of the Social Democrats on the working class and the consolidation of the Social Democratic labor movement". (Volume 13, page 215. [Our emphasis].).

One could cite such quotations from Lenin without number.

In contradistinction to this the epigones have converted the Soviets into a parading organizational uniform which the Party puts on the proletariat on the eve of the capture of power. But here we find that Soviets cannot be improvised in 24 hours, by order, with the direct object of an armed insurrection. Such experiments must unavoidably become of a fictitious character and the absence of the most necessary conditions for the capture of power be masqueraded by the external ceremonial of the Soviet system. That is what happened in Canton where the Soviet was simply appointed to perform the ritual. That is where the epigonian formulation of the question leads to.

In the polemics on the Chinese events the Opposition was accused of the following alleged crying contradiction. Whereas at the beginning of 1926 the Opposition advanced the slogan of Soviets for China, its representatives spoke against the slogan of Soviets for Germany in the Autumn of 1923. On no other point perhaps has scholastic political thought been expressed so glaringly as on this. Yes, we demanded for China a **TIMELY** start for the creation of Soviets as **INDEPENDENT** organizations of workers and peasants, **ON THE BASIS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNREST**. The chief significance of the Soviets was to be that of **SETTING UP THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS AGAINST THE KUOMINTANG BOURGEOISIE** and its Left Kuomintang agency. The slogan of Soviets in China first of all meant the break-up of the suicidal, shameful "Alliance of Four Classes" and the withdrawal of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang. The center of gravity consequently lay not in vague organizational forms, but in a class political line.

In the Autumn of 1923 in Germany it was a question of organizational form only. As a result of the extreme passivity, backwardness, and tardiness of the leadership of the Comintern and the Communist Party of Germany, the moment for a timely call for the organization of Soviets was missed and the factory committees had occupied in the labor movement of Germany by the Autumn of 1923 the place which, provided there had been a correct and daring policy on the part of the Communist Party, would have no doubt been much more successfully occupied by Soviets.

The acuteness of the situation had at the time

reached its highest degree. It was clear that to lose further time would mean definitely to miss the revolutionary situation. The uprising was finally put on the agenda with very little time left. To advance the slogan of Soviets under such conditions would have been the greatest doctrinarism conceivable. The Soviet is not a talisman which has the power to save everything. In the situation such as had then developed the creation of Soviets in a hurry would only have duplicated the factory committees. It would have become necessary to deprive the latter of their revolutionary functions and to pass them over to the newly created Soviets which would have been absolutely without any activity. And when? In conditions when each day counted. This would have meant to substitute for revolutionary action a vicious and most harmful game in organizational gew-gaw.

That the organizational form of a Soviet can be of gigantic importance, this is irrefutable, provided, however, that it reflects a correct political line and in proper time. It can, on the other hand be of no less negative importance if it is converted into a fiction, a talisman, a bagatelle. The creation at the very last moment of German Soviets in the Autumn of 1923 would have added nothing politically, it would only have caused organizational confusion. What happened in Canton is even still worse. The Soviet which was created in a hurry to perform the ritual was merely a masquerade for the adventurist putsch. That is why we found out after it was all over that the Canton Soviet was just one of those old Chinese dragons—simply drawn on paper. The policy of wire-pulling and paper dragons is not our policy. We were against the improvising of Soviets by telegraph in Germany in September 1923. We were for the

creation of Soviets in China in 1926. We were against masquerade Soviets in Canton in 1927. There is nothing contradictory in that. In that we see a deep integral understanding of the dynamics of the revolutionary movement and its organizational forms.

The question of the role and significance of the Soviets which has been distorted and confused and overshadowed by the theory and practice of recent years, has not been illuminated in the least in the draft program.

6. THE QUESTION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION.

The slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat which leads behind it the rural poor is inseparably bound up with the question of the Socialist character of the coming, third revolution in China. And inasmuch as not only history, but also mistakes which people make in meeting its requirements, repeat themselves, we can already hear the objection raised that China has not yet matured for a Socialist revolution. But this is an abstract and lifeless formulation of the question. Has Russia, if isolated from the rest of the world, matured for Socialism? According to Lenin it has not. It has matured for the dictatorship of the proletariat as the only method of solution of national problems which cannot be delayed.

But the general destiny of the dictatorship as a whole is in the final analysis determined by the trend of world development, which, of course, does not exclude but presupposes a correct policy on the part of the proletarian dictatorship, the consolidation and development of the workers' and peasants' alliance, flexible adaptation to national conditions on the one hand, and the trend of world development on the other. This fully holds good also for China. In the same article "As to Our Revolution" (January 16, 1923) in which Lenin establishes that the peculiarity of Russia lies in the fact that it proceeds along the lines of the peculiar development of the Eastern countries, he dubs as "endlessly hackneyed" the argument of European Social Democracy to the effect "that we have not developed enough for Socialism, that we have not, as some 'learned' gentlemen say, the necessary objective economic prerequisites for Social-

ism". But Lenin ridicules the "learned" gentlemen not because he himself believes in the existence of the necessary economic prerequisites for Socialism in Russia but because he holds that from the absence of these prerequisites necessary for an INDEPENDENT construction of Socialism it does not at all follow, as the pedants and philistines think, that the idea of the conquest of power has to be rejected. In that article Lenin for the hundred and first or perhaps for the thousand and first time replies to the sophisms of the heroes of the Second International:

"This INCONTROVERTIBLE consideration (about the immaturity of Russia for Socialism)... is not decisive in an evaluation of our revolution." (Volume 18, part 2, page 118 and 119).

That is what the authors of the draft program will not and cannot understand. Notice that the argument about the economic and cultural immaturity of China as well as Russia—China of course more so than Russia—is incontrovertible. But from here it does not in the least follow that the proletariat has to give up the idea of capturing power, which capture is dictated by the whole historical position and revolutionary situation in the country.

The concrete historical, political and actual question is not whether China has economically ripened for Socialism, but whether she has ripened politically for the proletarian dictatorship. These two questions are not by any means identical. They might have been identical were it not for the fact that we have a law of uneven development. That is where the law holds good and fully applies to the inter-relationships between economics and politics. Thus, has China matured for a proletarian dictatorship? Only the progress of the struggle can give a categorical answer to this ques-

tion. Likewise only the struggle can settle the question as to when and under what conditions will the real unification, emancipation and regeneration of China take place. Anyone who says that China has not ripened for the dictatorship of the proletariat declares thereby that the third Chinese revolution is postponed for many years.

Of course matters would be quite hopeless if feudal survivals would really DOMINATE in Chinese economics, as the resolution of the E.C.C.I. asserts. But unfortunately, SURVIVALS in general cannot dominate. The draft program also on this point does not rectify the committed errors, but repeats them in a roundabout and loose manner. The draft speaks of the "predominance of feudal medieval relations both in the economics of the country as well as in the political superstructure..." This is fundamentally wrong. What does PRE-DOMINATE mean? Is it by the number of people involved? Or is it by the dominant and leading role in the economics of the country? The extraordinarily rapid growth of home industry on the basis of the all-embracing role of merchant and bank capital—complete dependence of the chief agrarian districts on the market, enormous and ever-growing foreign trade, all around subordination of the Chinese villages to the towns—goes to show the unconditional predominance, the direct sway of capitalist relations in China. Serf and semi-serf relations are undeniably very strong. They have originated partly in the days of feudalism, they partly constitute a new formation which regenerates the old on the basis of the retarded development of the productive forces, the surplus agrarian population, the activities of merchants' and usurers' capital, etc. However, not "feudal" (more correctly, serf and, generally, pre-capitalist) rela-

tions DOMINATE but capitalist relations. Only thanks to this unconditional role of capitalist relations can we speak seriously of the prospects of proletarian hegemony in the national revolution. Otherwise we find that the different ends do not meet.

The role of the Chinese proletariat in production is already very great. In the next few years it will increase still further. Its political role, as events have shown, could have been gigantic. But the policy of the leadership was, as has been shown, entirely directed against the capture of a leading role by the proletariat.

The draft program says that successful Socialist construction is possible in China "only on condition of direct support from countries under the proletarian dictatorship." Thus, here, in relation to China, the same principle is recognized which the Party always, recognized in regard to Russia. But if China has no sufficient inner forces for an INDEPENDENT construction of Socialist society then, according to the theory of Stalin and Bucharin, the Chinese proletariat should not take power in any of the stages of the Revolution. Or perhaps the existence of the U.S.S.R. settles the question otherwise? Then it follows that our technique is sufficient to build up a Socialist society not only here in the U.S.S.R., but also in China, viz., in the two economically most backward big countries. Or perhaps the inevitable dictatorship of the proletariat in China is "admissible" because that dictatorship will be included in the chain of the worldwide Socialist revolution thus becoming not only its link, but its driving force? But this is precisely Lenin's main idea in relation to the October Revolution, the "peculiarity" of which lies precisely along the lines of development of the Eastern

countries. We see thus how the revisionist theory of Socialism in one country evolved in 1925 in the struggle against "Trotskyism" confuses and muddles up matters in approaching any new big revolutionary problem.

The draft program goes still further along these lines. It distinguishes China and India from "Russia of 1917, Poland ('etc.?) as countries with a certain MINIMUM of industry sufficient for successful Socialist construction" or (which is more definitely and therefore more erroneously stated elsewhere) as countries possessing the "necessary and sufficient material prerequisites . . . for the complete construction of Socialism." Here as we already know there is a mere word play on Lenin's expression "necessary and sufficient" prerequisites, a false and inadmissible play because Lenin definitely enumerates the political and organizational prerequisites, including the TECHNICAL, CULTURAL AND INTERNATIONAL prerequisites. But the other chief point is HOW can one decide *a priori* whether a "MINIMUM OF INDUSTRY" is sufficient for the complete building up of Socialism once it is a question of an uninterrupted world struggle between two economic systems, two social orders, of which our ECONOMIC basis is in this struggle immeasurably weaker?

If we take the economic lever only, it is clear that we in the U.S.S.R., and particularly so in China and India, are sitting on the incomparably "shorter" end than world capitalism. But the whole question is determined by the REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE between the two systems on a world scale. The political long end of the lever is ON OUR SIDE, or, to speak more correctly, must be in our hands, provided we pursue a correct political line.

In the same article "As to Our Revolution", after the words that "a certain cultural level is necessary for the establishment of Socialism", Lenin remarks: "Although no one can tell exactly what this certain cultural level might be." Why can no one tell? Because the question is settled by the struggle, by the competition between the two social systems and the two cultures, ON AN INTERNATIONAL SCALE. Fully departing from this idea of Lenin's, which follows from the very substance of the question, the draft program declares that Russia had in 1917 precisely the "minimum technique" and hence also the culture necessary for the building up of Socialism in one country. The authors of the draft are trying to say in the program that which "no one can say" *a priori*.

It is impossible, one cannot, and it is stupid to seek a criterion for the "sufficient minimum" within national statics ("Russia prior to 1917") when the whole question is decided by international dynamics. In this wrong, arbitrary and isolated national criterion appears the theoretical basis of national narrow-mindedness in politics, the prerequisite for inevitable national reformist and social patriotic blunders in the future.

7. ON THE REACTIONARY IDEA OF WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' PARTIES FOR THE EAST.

The lesson of the second Chinese Revolution is a lesson for the entire Comintern, first and foremost for all Eastern countries.

All arguments brought forward in defense of the Menshevik policy in the Chinese Revolution must, if we take them for what they are worth, be held trebly good for India. The imperialist yoke has in India, in that classic colony, immeasurably higher palpable forms than in China. The survivals of feudal and serf relations in India are immeasurably deeper and greater. Nevertheless, or, more correctly, precisely because of that, the methods applied in China which undermined the revolution must result in India in even more destructive consequences. To abolish Indian serfdom and overthrow the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy and British militarism is a thing which can be accomplished only by a gigantic and irresistible mass movement of the people, and precisely because of its powerful sweep and irresistibility, its international purposes and relationships, it will not tolerate any half-way and compromising opportunist measures on the part of the leadership.

The Comintern leadership has already made not a few mistakes in India. Conditions have not yet allowed these errors to reveal themselves on such a scale as in China. It is, therefore, to be hoped that the lessons of the Chinese events will straighten out in good time the line of the leading policy in India and in other Eastern countries.

The central question for us here, as everywhere and always, is the question of the Communist Party, its complete independence, its irreconcilable

class character. The greatest danger on this path is constituted by the organization of so-called "Workers' and Peasants' Parties" in the Eastern countries.

In 1924, a year which will be regarded as a year of open revision of a series of fundamental ideas of Marx and Lenin, Stalin advanced the idea of "dual composition of Workers' and Peasants' Parties" for the Eastern countries. It was based on the same ground of national oppression. Cables from India, as well as from Japan, where there is no national oppression, have of late frequently reported about activities of provincial "Workers' and Peasants' Parties" as of organizations which are related, and friendly to the Comintern, as if they were almost our "own" organizations, without, however, giving a more or less concrete statement as to their political physiognomy; in a word, it is exactly what has not so very long ago been written about the Kuomintang. The least dubiousness in this sphere is destructive. It is a question here of an absolutely new, entirely false and thoroughly un-Marxian orientation on the main question of the Party and of its relations to the class and the classes.

The necessity for the Communist Party of China to be affiliated with the Kuomintang was defended on the ground that the social composition of the Kuomintang was a Party of workers and peasants, that nine-tenths of the Kuomintang—this figure was repeated hundreds of times—belong to the revolutionary elements and are ready to march hand in hand with the Communist Party. However, during and since the *coups d'Etat* in Shanghai and Wuchang, these revolutionary nine-tenths of the Kuomintang have disappeared. No one has as yet found their traces. And the theoreticians of

class collaboration in China, Stalin, Bucharin and others, have not even taken the trouble to explain what has become of the workers and peasants, the revolutionary, friendly and entirely our "own" nine-tenths of the Kuomintang membership. However, an answer to this question is of decisive importance if we are to understand in the future the fate of all these "dual composition" parties and have a clear idea of their very conception which throws us back far behind not only the program of the C.P.S.U. of 1919, but even the manifesto of the Communist Party of 1847.

The question as to what has become of the celebrated nine-tenths becomes clear to us only if we understand, first, the impossibility of a dual composition, that is, a dual class Party, expressing simultaneously two mutually exclusive historical lines—the proletarian and petty-bourgeois lines,—secondly, the impossibility to have in capitalist society an independent peasant party, that is, a party independent of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Marxism has always taught, and that was accepted by Bolshevism, that the peasantry and the proletariat are two different classes, that every identification of their interests in capitalist society is false, and that the peasant can join the Communist Party if, from the property viewpoint, he adopts the views of the proletariat. An alliance of the workers and peasants under the proletarian dictatorship does not do away with this fact, but confirms it, only in a different way, and under different circumstances. Were it not for the fact that they are DIFFERENT classes and have DIFFERENT interests, there would be no need for AN ALLIANCE. Such an alliance is compatible with the Socialist revolution only inasmuch as it exists within the iron frame of the proletarian dictator-

ship. In our country a dictatorship is incompatible with the existence of a so-called Peasant League precisely because every "independent" peasant organization with its own national political objects would inevitably be found to be an instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

Those organizations which in capitalist countries are known as Peasant Parties are in reality a peculiar type of bourgeois party. The peasant who has not accepted the proletarian position in view of his private property will inevitably look towards the bourgeoisie when it comes to fundamental political issues. Of course, any bourgeois party that relies or wants to rely on the peasantry, and, if possible, on the workers, is compelled to masquerade, that is, to create the impression that it consists of two or three different component parts. The celebrated idea of the "Workers' and Peasants' Parties" it would seem, has been purposely created to camouflage the bourgeois parties which must seek support from the peasantry and are even ready to have in their ranks also workers. The Kuomintang has from now on forever entered the annals of history as a classic type of such a party.

Bourgeois society as is known, is so built that the propertyless, discontented and deceived masses are at the bottom and the contented and the fakers are at the top. On the same principle is also built every bourgeois party, if it is a real party, that is, if it has in its ranks considerable masses. The exploiters, fakers and violators are in the minority in class society, every capitalist party is therefore compelled in its internal relations, in one way or another, to reproduce or reflect the relations of bourgeois society in its entirety. In every mass bourgeois party the lower ranks are therefore more democratic and more radical than the leaders. This

is true of the German Center, the German liberals, and particularly the German Social Democrats. That is why the constant complaints voiced by Stalin, Bucharin and others that the leaders did not reflect the sentiments of the "Left" Kuomintang rank and file, the "overwhelming majority", the "nine-tenths", etc., etc., were so unpardonably naive. That which was regarded as a temporary disagreeable misunderstanding which must be eliminated by means of organizational measures, instructions and circulars, is in reality a fundamental and basic feature of any bourgeois party, particularly in a revolutionary epoch.

It is from this angle that the chief argument of the authors of the draft program in defense of all kinds of opportunist blocs in general—in England or China—must be viewed. According to them fraternization with the leaders is done exclusively in the interests of the rank and file. The Opposition, as is known, insisted on a withdrawal from the Kuomintang:

"The question arises," says Bucharin, "why? Is it because the leaders of the Kuomintang vacillated? And what about the Kuomintang masses, are they mere 'cattle'? Since when is the attitude to a mass organisation determined by what is done by its leaders?" (The Present Situation in the Chinese Revolution).

The very possibility of such an argument seems impossible in a revolutionary party. Bucharin asks "And what about the Kuomintang masses, are they mere cattle?" Of course they are cattle. The masses of any bourgeois party are always cattle, although in different degrees. For us, the masses are not cattle. They are not cattle, and that is precisely why we do not drive them to the bourgeoisie, CAMOUFLAGING THE BOURGEOISIE BY MEANS OF A WORKERS' AND

PEASANTS' PARTY. That is precisely why we must not try to subordinate the proletarian party to the bourgeoisie, but on the contrary, must at every step, set up one against the other. The leaders of the Kuomintang of whom Bucharin speaks so ironically, as of some secondary, accidental and temporary event, are in reality the soul of the Kuomintang, its social substance. Of course the bourgeoisie constitutes only the "top" in the Party as well as in society, but this top has capital, knowledge, connection; it can always fall back on the imperialists for support, and what is more it has actual political military power which directly merges with power in the Kuomintang itself. Precisely this top wrote laws against strikes, throttled the movement of the peasants, got the Communists into a dark corner, and, at best, allowed them to be only one-third of the Party, took an oath from them that petty-bourgeois Sun Yat Senism is for them above Marxism. The rank and file were picked; they served it, like Moscow, as a "Left" support, just as the generals, compradores and imperialists served it as a Right support. To consider the Kuomintang not as a BOURGEOIS PARTY, but as a NEUTRAL ARENA OF STRUGGLE FOR THE MASSES, to play on nine-tenths of the Left bourgeoisie in order to conceal the question as to who is the real master, meant to add strength and power to the leaders, to help them to convert ever larger numbers into "cattle", and, under favorable conditions, to prepare the Shanghai *coup d'Etat*. Based on the reactionary idea of the dual composition of the Party, Stalin and Bucharin imagined that the Communists together with the "Lefts" will secure a majority in the Kuomintang and thereby power in the country, as in China power was in the hands of the Kuo-

mintang. In other words, they imagined that by means of ordinary elections at a Kuomintang Congress power would pass over from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat. Can one imagine a more idealistic idolization of "party democracy" . . . in relation to a bourgeois party? It must be understood that the army, the bureaucracy, the press, and capital are in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Precisely because of this it already has leadership in the governing party. The bourgeois "top" tolerates or tolerated "nine-tenths" of the Lefts, and SUCH KIND of Lefts, inasmuch as they did not venture to tackle the army, the bureaucracy, the press and their capital. By this powerful means the bourgeois top holds in subjection not only the so-called nine-tenths of the "Left" Party members, but also the masses in general. The theory of class alliance, the theory that the Kuomintang is a workers' and peasants' party, is the best the bourgeoisie hopes for. When the bourgeoisie later meets face to face with the hostility of the masses and shoots them down, in this clash of two real forces, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, there is not even a whisper heard of the celebrated nine-tenths. The pitiful democratic fiction disappears without a trace in face of the bloody reality of the class struggle.

Such is the real and only possible political mechanism of the "dual composition Workers' and Peasants' Parties for the East." There is no other and there will not be.

* * *

Although the idea of dual composition parties is motivated on national oppression, as if this neutralizes Marx' class doctrine, we have heard already about "Workers' and Peasants'" bagatelles in Japan where there is no national oppression at

all. Moreover, this is not limited merely to the East. The "dual composition" idea is endeavoring to become universal. The most caricature-like character in this respect was assumed by the Workers' Party of America in its efforts to support the candidature of the bourgeois, "anti-Trust" Senator La Follette, so as to attach, in this manner, the American farmers to the wheel of the Social Revolution. Pepper, the theoretician of the manoeuvre, who is one of those who has ruined the Hungarian Revolution and who failed to notice the Hungarian peasantry, made here a great effort to ruin the Workers' Party in its first stages of activity. Pepper's theory was that the super-profit of American capitalism converts the American proletariat into a world labor aristocracy while the agrarian crisis ruins the farmers and drives them onto the path of social revolution. A party of several thousand members, consisting chiefly of immigrants, had, according to Pepper, to make common cause with the farmers through a bourgeois party and form a dual composition party, insuring thus the social revolution with the passivity or neutrality of the proletariat which has been corrupted by super-profits. This confused idea had its followers and half followers among the leaders of the Comintern. In the course of a few weeks the scales vacillated from one side to the other until finally a concession was made to the letter of Marxism. Having been taken off its feet the American Party had to be cut off from the noose of the La Follette party which died even before its founder.

What modern revisionism invents for the East is carried over to the West. If Pepper tried across the Atlantic to whip up history by means of a dual composition party in the United States, the latest

information tells us that the Kuomintang experience finds its supporters in Italy where they are endeavoring to force on our Party the monstrous slogan of a "Republican Assembly on the Basis (?) of Workers' and Peasants' Committees". In this slogan the spirit of Chiang Kai-shek embraces the spirit of Hilferding. Will we really come to that?

* * *

In closing, we only have to recall that the idea of a "Workers' and Peasants' Party" discards from the history of Bolshevism the entire struggle against the Narodniki, without which there would have been no Bolshevik Party. What was the essence of that historical struggle? Lenin wrote about the S. R.s in 1909, the following :

"The general idea of their program was not that 'an alliance of the forces' of the proletariat and peasantry is necessary, but that THERE IS NO CLASS DIFFERENCE between the two, that there is no need to draw a class distinction between them, that the Social Democratic idea concerning the petty-bourgeois character of the peasantry in contradistinction to the proletariat is fundamentally wrong." (Vol. 11, Part 1, page 198).

In other words, the dual composition Workers' and Peasants' Party was the central idea of the Russian Narodniki. Only in the struggle against this idea could the Party of the proletarian vanguard in peasant Russia develop.

Lenin insistently and persistently repeated in the epoch of the 1905 revolution, that:

"Distrust the peasantry, ORGANIZE SEPARATELY FROM THEM, be ready for a struggle against them, inasmuch as the peasants are a reactionary or anti-proletarian force." (Vol. 6, page 113. Our emphasis).

In 1906 Lenin wrote:

"The last advice is, proletarians and semi-proletarians of town and country, organize separately. Do

not trust any possessors, even those small ones, even though they 'labor'... We support the peasant movement to the end, but we must remember that it is a movement of another class, not the class which can or will accomplish the social revolution." (Vol 9, page 410).

This idea can be found in hundreds of the larger and smaller works of Lenin. In 1908, he said:

"The alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, we will remark in passing, must by no means be understood in the sense of a MERGING OF THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OR PARTIES of the proletariat and the peasantry. Not only merging, but even ANY PROLONGED CONCORDANCE would be detrimental for the socialist revolution of the working class and would weaken the revolutionary democratic struggle." (Vol. 11, Part 1, page 79. Our emphasis).

Is it possible to condemn the very idea of a Workers' and Peasants' Party more sharply, more ruthlessly and more effectively?

Lenin puts the question in the same irreconcilable spirit also in the epoch of the October Revolution. In generalizing the experiences of the third Russian revolution, Lenin, beginning with 1918, does not miss a single opportunity to repeat that in a society where capitalist relations predominate there are only two decisive forces—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

"If the peasant does not follow the workers, he follows the bourgeoisie. There is and there can be no middle course." (Vol. 16, page 290).

However, the "Workers' and Peasants' Party" is an attempt at the creation of a middle course.

If the vanguard of the Russian proletariat had not stood up distinctly against the peasantry, if it had not waged a ruthless struggle against the petty-bourgeois looseness of the latter, it would inevitably have itself been dissolved among the

petty-bourgeois elements through the S. R.s or some other "dual composition" Party which, in turn, would itself inevitably have been subordinated to a bourgeois leadership. In order to arrive at a revolutionary alliance with the peasantry—this is not attained so easily—it is first of all necessary to separate the proletarian vanguard and thereby the working class as a whole, from the petty-bourgeois masses. This can be attained only by means of training the proletarian party in the spirit of staunch class irreconciliability. The newer the proletariat, the fresher and more direct its "blood relationships" with the peasantry, the greater becomes the importance of the struggle against any forms of the "dual composition" political alchemy. In the West the idea of a Workers' and Peasants' Party is simply ridiculous. In the East it is ruinous. In China, India and Japan this idea is deadly hostile not only to the hegemony of the proletariat and the revolution, but to the most elementary independence of the proletarian vanguard. The Workers' and Peasants' Party can only be a basis, a cover, a spring-board for the bourgeoisie.

Fatalistically also, in this fundamental question for the East, modern revisionism only repeats the errors of pre-revolutionary Social Democratic opportunism. Most of the leaders of European Social Democracy considered the struggle of our Party against the S. R.s a mistake and insistently urged the merging of the two parties, holding that for the Russian "East" a dual composition Workers' and Peasants' Party is just the thing. Had we taken their advice we would have never realized the alliance of the workers and peasants nor the dictatorship of the proletariat. The "dual composition" Workers' and Peasants' Party of the S.R.s

became, and could not help becoming in our country, an agency of the imperialist bourgeoisie, that is, it tried without success, to fulfil the same historical mission in a different and "peculiar" way that the Kuomintang successfully fulfilled in China. Without containing a relentless condemnation of the very idea of Workers' and Peasants' Parties for the East, there is not and there cannot be a Comintern program.

8. THE BENEFITS OBTAINED FROM THE FARMERS' AND PEASANTS' INTERNATIONAL MUST BE PROBED.

One of the main, if not the main accusations hurled against the Opposition, was that of its "under-estimation" of the peasantry. Also on this point life has given the test proof both along the internal and the international lines. The official leaders proved guilty of UNDER-ESTIMATING the role and significance of the proletariat in relation to the peasantry all along the line. Here can be mentioned the greatest blunders and errors along the economic, political and international lines.

At the bottom of the internal errors, since 1923 there lies an under-estimation of the significance of State industry under the management of the proletariat for the whole of national economy and for the alliance with the peasantry. In China the revolution was lost by the failure to understand the leading and decisive role of the proletariat in relation to the agrarian revolution.

From the same viewpoint it is necessary to examine and estimate the role of the work of the Krestintern* which from the beginning was not more than an experiment—an experiment which required the utmost vigilance, and integrity of principle, to boot. It is not difficult to understand the reason why.

The peasantry, by the history and conditions of its life, is the least international of all classes. What is called national traits has its chief source precisely in the peasantry. The peasantry and only its semi-proletarian sections at that can be interested in the international cause, only under the

* Krestintern is a combined abbreviation in Russian of the words Peasants International.—Ed.

guidance of the proletariat. All roundabout ways are a mere play with classes, and such playing is always detrimental to the interests of the proletariat. Only to the extent that the national peasantry is severed by the national proletariat from the influence of the national bourgeoisie and is trained to see in the proletariat not only its ally, but also its leader, can it be attracted to the path of international politics. Attempts, however, to organize the peasants of the various countries into an independent international organization over the head of the proletariat and regardless of the national Communist Parties, are doomed beforehand to failure and, in the final analysis, can only hamper the struggle of the national proletariat for influence on the agricultural laborers and poor peasants.

In bourgeois revolutions as well as counter-revolutions, beginning with the peasant wars of the sixteenth century, the various strata of the peasantry played an enormous and, at times, even decisive role. But this role was never an independent role. Directly or indirectly the peasantry always supported one political force against another. By itself it never constituted an independent force, having its own common national political tasks. In the epoch of finance capital the polarization of capitalist society has constantly progressed as compared with the phase of capitalist development. This means that the relative strength of the peasantry has diminished and not increased. At any rate, in the imperialist epoch the peasants of the capitalist countries are less capable of INDEPENDENT political action on a national scale than in the epoch of industrial capitalism. The farmers of the United States today are incomparably less capable of playing an independent political role than forty or fifty years ago when, as the experience of

the Populist movement shows, they could not organize an independent national party.

The temporary but sharp agrarianization of Europe as a result of the economic decline caused by the war has given rise to illusions concerning the possible role of "peasant", that is, bourgeois pseudo-peasant Parties. If in the period of grave peasant unrest after the war one could still risk the experiment of organizing a farmers' and peasants' international so as to test by experience the new relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, the peasantry and the bourgeoisie, the time has at last come when the five years experience of the Farmers' and Peasants' International must be theoretically and politically summarized, its great shortcomings revealed and an effort made to show what are its advantages. One conclusion at any rate cannot be denied. The experience of the "peasant" parties of Bulgaria, Poland, Roumania and Jugo-Slavia, that is, of the backward countries, the old experience of our Social Revolutionaries, and the fresh (the blood is not yet dried) experience with the Kuomintang, the sporadic experience in the advanced capitalist countries, particularly that of La Follette and Pepper in the United States, have invariably shown that in the epoch of capitalist decline there is even less reason to look for INDEPENDENT revolutionary anti-bourgeois peasant parties than in the epoch of rising capitalism.

"The town cannot be equalled to the village; the village cannot be equalled to the town in the historical conditions of that epoch. The town inevitably LEADS THE VILLAGE, the village inevitably FOLLOWS THE TOWN. It is only a question WHICH 'Urban' CLASS will be able to rally the village to its side." (Lenin, Vol. 16, page 442).

In the revolutions of the East, the peasants will

still play a decisive role but this role, again, will be neither leading nor independent. The poor peasants of Hupeh, Kwantung, or Bengal can play a role not only on a national but also on an international scale. However, only on condition that they will support the workers of Shanghai, Hankow, Canton and Calcutta. This is the only way out for the revolutionary peasant ON AN INTERNATIONAL road. The effort immediately to unite the peasants of Hupeh with the peasants of Galicia or Dobrudja, the Egyptian fellah with the American farmer, is hopeless.

But the nature of politics is such that everything which does not directly serve its object inevitably becomes an instrument for other objects, frequently for the very opposite ones. Have we not seen examples when a bourgeois party, which relied on the peasantry or sought to rely on it, became interested in the Farmers' and Peasants' International for a longer or shorter period if it could not do so in the Comintern, only in order to find protection from the blows of its own Communist Party, as Purcell, in the trade union domain, protected himself through the Anglo-Russian Committee? If La Follette did not try to register in the Farmers' and Peasants' International that was due to the extreme weakness of the American Communist Party, the more so considering that at that time its leader Pepper, without an invitation, embraced La Follette, even without that. But Raditch, the bankers' leader of the Croatian rich peasants, found it necessary to leave his visiting card in the Farmers' and Peasants' International on his road to the Cabinet. The Kuomintang went much further than that and secured protection for itself, not only in the Farmers' International and the Anti-Imperialist League, but even knocked at the doors

of the Politbureau of the C.P.S.U., against only one vote.

It is very significant for the leading political tendencies of recent years that whereas tendencies in favor of the liquidation of the PROFINTERN (the Red International of Labor Unions) were very strong (its very name was deleted from the statutes of Soviet trade unions), we find that, so far as we remember, the question has never been raised in the official press as to what exactly are the conquests of the FARMERS' AND PEASANTS' INTERNATIONAL.

The Sixth Congress must seriously probe the work of the Farmers' and Peasants' "International" from the viewpoint of proletarian internationalism. It is high time to give a Marxian summary of the drawn-out experiment.

THE END

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